The UPI system has never been free, but questions have arisen regarding the fairness of introducing a new commission for merchants. Since any network processing trillions of rupees monthly requires funding, the key issue is determining who will bear the costs and how.
For six years, funding was provided through government subsidies, bank technology budgets, and reduced savings interest rates for depositors. As RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra noted, 'Even now it is not free; someone pays for it.' The new Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) makes this cost evident.
In the financial year 26, UPI processed over 24,000 crore transactions worth approximately 314 lakh crore rupees ($3.31 trillion USD), and from April to September 2026, 14,500 crore transactions worth 177 lakh crore rupees ($1.86 trillion USD). According to the IMF, UPI processes about half of global real-time payments by volume.
In July, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) indicated that fast payment systems with zero user fees and mandatory participation are growing rapidly, but private companies managing them face revenue challenges.
Compared to some international payment systems, UPI's MDR is 0.4% for payments over 2,000 rupees, which is lower than Indonesia's QRIS (0.7% for large merchants) and Chinese wallets (around 0.6%), and closer to Brazil's Pix (approximately 0.22–0.33%), and significantly less than credit card fees. In India, sellers receiving up to 1 lakh rupees per month pay no fees, while railway, fuel, utility, and insurance services are subject to a fixed rate of 5 rupees.
The commission in India is free up to 2,000 rupees ($21 USD), which is about four times more than in Indonesia. According to NPCI, over 96% of merchant transactions by volume remain free. For example, a seller receiving 75,000 rupees via NEFT pays nothing, whereas the same amount via UPI would cost 300 rupees plus GST.
In August 26, the volume of UPI merchant payments reached approximately 8.95 lakh crore rupees ($94 billion USD), of which about 6 lakh crore rupees ($63 billion USD) exceeded the 2,000 rupee threshold. Considering sectors with a fixed rate of 5 rupees and the set limit, the effective rate is approximately 0.15–0.20%, generating an annual pool of about 12,500 crore rupees ($1.32 billion USD). Under the current formula, banks receive 40%, acquirers 30%, applications 20%, and PSP payers/sponsor banks connecting apps to UPI 10%. Banks could potentially receive 60 to 70%.
According to the BIS bulletin, PhonePe and Google Pay currently control about 80% of the user-facing market. Together, they could collect around 2,100 crore rupees ($221 million USD) annually. BIS notes that when the market is concentrated in the hands of a few players, mere interoperability may not be enough to restore equitable distribution.
NPCI announced a 30% volume cap for any single application in November 2020, but this decision has been postponed three times and remains unimplemented after six years because it proved difficult to divert customers.
An IMF note states that payments provide large tech firms with stable income and data for selling credit and other services. This commission, intended to cover incurred costs, will ultimately fund the broader ambitions of the two leaders. Another aspect is the 18% GST, which applies only to the MDR, not the total payment amount. At the maximum limit, the merchant pays 354 rupees. Registered sellers can reclaim this amount as input tax credit. The real cost falls on those sellers who cannot reclaim this GST—for instance, composite dealers and tax-exempt goods sellers.
Shifting costs to the customer will not stop price increases by sellers; a buyer of a 500 rupee charger might end up paying for a 50,000 rupee phone. Furthermore, charging even 5 rupees for single loan repayments over 2,000 rupees, after many years of microfinance borrowers moving away from cash, is a regressive step. Banning surcharges will not prevent stores from raising prices, so a buyer of a 500 rupee charger is unknowingly helping to pay for a 50,000 rupee phone.
The author proposes setting the commission at 100 rupees (pre-2020) and reviewing it every two years based on audited cost data, similar to how the US Federal Reserve does for debit cards. BIS points out that such data is currently unavailable, and banks and NPCI must address this immediately.
It is suggested that the RBI, rather than NPCI, should set the rate, as is done for debit cards, NEFT, and RTGS. NPCI belongs to the banks that collect the majority of the commission. The share of applications should also be reduced as volumes grow so that the largest players earn less per transaction, and the RBI should be allowed to set levels after public consultations. Unlike volume caps, this reduction works through pricing.
It is also proposed that information on who received how much from payments be published annually. The 5-rupee fee for loan repayment should be abolished, as repayment is not a purchase. Acquiring banks should be held accountable for surcharges, and the limits of 2,000 rupees and 1 lakh rupees should be increased considering inflation. NPCI postponed implementation after Diwali, and a public petition is before the Supreme Court. This time should be used to correct the structure itself, not to re-debate the necessity of charging fees. UPI has gained the trust of hundreds of millions of Indians due to its simplicity and fairness, and its price must meet this same criterion.


