MTN confirmed that it is in talks to purchase the entire Telkom company, considering a cash payment. The following day, Telkom's consumer business head told analysts that the South African mobile market is in a price war, noting that competitors are starting to narrow the gap between their prices and Telkom's prices.
Comparing these two statements allows one to see part of the commercial logic behind MTN's approach: Telkom initiated a price war, and buying the company could stop it.
In recent years, Telkom was an operator that competitors reacted to. The company implemented a data-driven strategy that competitors struggled to replicate for a long time. It began offering free calls to customers when they purchased data bundles, which, according to it, caused a 'market shift,' resulting in a 13.1% decrease in voice revenue over six months leading up to September. It currently has 26.3 million mobile subscribers.
Part of this growth came from MTN. MTN Group CEO Ralph Mupita admitted in September 2025 that 'the loss from Telkom is noticeable.' Since then, MTN South Africa has lost about two million prepaid customers over 12 months leading up to September, which the company describes as a deliberate step towards a healthier and more valuable customer base.
However, this does not mean that MTN's interest is cynical or that the deal should be blocked. The telecommunications industry is a game of scale. Spectrum, 5G radio networks, fiber optics, backup power, and constant updates that customers now take for granted require significant financial investment, and Telkom's own results demonstrate this burden. Its capital expenditure fell by 22.5% to 2.2 billion rand for the half-year, and investments in fiber optics decreased by 35.1%. Mobile service revenue growth slowed to 4%, compared to 6.4% in the first quarter alone. A disruptor that cannot finance its network at scale will not remain a disruptor for long.
Cell C exemplifies such a path. South Africa's fourth-largest mobile operator no longer manages its own radio network, relying on roaming agreements with MTN and Vodacom. This month, MTN reported that they failed to agree on 'certain issues' in their commercial relationship.
Excluding Telkom, two players of large-scale mobile infrastructure will remain in the country: Vodacom and an expanded MTN. Rain, which built its own network, is a much more niche player. Cell C and fast-growing virtual operators, including Capitec Connect, compete on price, but they do so on networks owned by the very companies they compete against. Their prices can be as low as wholesale conditions allow.
Mupita has openly stated his view that South Africa needs two, and at best three, major mobile operators. He cited the merger of T-Mobile and Sprint in the US, which succeeded after four attempts. However, US regulators only approved this deal after the companies agreed to sell Sprint's prepaid business, including Boost Mobile, and Dish's spectrum, so that a new fourth network could replace the disappearing one.
This is the model that the Competition Commission and Icasa, the communications regulator, should start considering. The author notes that he is not a proponent of regulation for regulation's sake (in most cases, regulators in functioning markets should step aside), but approving such a merger based on promises of proper conduct or price commitments with an expiration date of a few years would be insufficient. If MTN wants to acquire Telkom, the remedies must be structural.
Some of Telkom's spectrum assets should transfer to an operator that is neither Vodacom nor MTN. And if Telkom's fiber optic business, Openserve, which is the second largest in the country after Vumatel, goes to MTN, it must remain genuinely open to competing service providers, with strict conditions set to prevent abuse. Vodacom already jointly controls the parent company Vumatel, Maziv. A market where the two largest mobile operators also own the two largest fiber optic networks may require more than just goodwill to remain competitive.
None of these conditions should deter MTN. They will be added to the sum, which already exceeds 30 billion rand, representing Telkom's value before the latest negotiations were announced, plus any premium required by the cash offer.
The deal carries real risks for MTN. Transactions of this nature take years: the purchase of Vodacom's stake in Maziv took almost four years after the Competition Tribunal initially blocked it. And that deal was not as complex as this one. Prolonged pursuit can also distract management from daily operations.
Employees of both companies will face months, possibly years, of uncertainty, and Telkom's unions will likely demand job security guarantees. Competitors can use this time to attract customers and talent. Furthermore, there is a cultural aspect: integrating a former state monopoly, with its own history of labor relations and state oversight, into a commercially oriented multinational corporation will be a difficult task.
Mupita may be right that South Africa cannot sustain three or four mobile network operators. But consolidation comes at a cost, and someone will pay for it. If regulators set the right conditions, MTN will do it. Otherwise, it will be the customers who switched to Telkom for cheaper data and then find out that no one is left to offer them lower prices than the two giants.
