Researcher Rui Verde asserts that Russia is increasing its presence in Southern Africa, but its strategy is no longer focused on Angola; it is shifting towards other regional alternatives, specifically Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Rui Verde published an analysis on the CEDESA page, the research and development center for Angola, dedicated to strengthening Russian influence in Mozambique and the DRC. These countries are also important for Angola. The analysis is based on initiatives that arose during the III Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow on October 28 and 29.
According to the lawyer, this summit was 'more than just a symbolic public relations exercise by the Kremlin,' as it marked a significant acceleration of Russian diplomacy in Southern Africa. During this period, Angola's growing rapprochement with the United States, the European Union, and Western institutions became evident, while Russia is restoring its influence in the strategic space around Angola.
Verde believes that a situation of relative encirclement of Angola is forming amid regional restructuring, where Moscow is once again becoming a significant player.
Rui Verde highlights the presence of Mozambican President Daniel Chiapo in Moscow. This visit contributed to deepening cooperation in areas such as energy, mining, agriculture, transport, education, science, and information technology. More importantly, an agreement on military training and counter-terrorism in Cabo Delgado was reached.
'The main political significance of the visit lies not only in economic agreements but also in the revival of security partnership between Moscow and Maputo,' writes Rui Verde. Moscow is once again acting as an important military partner in this country at a time of escalating competition between external powers for influence.
The convergence in the energy sector is also significant, as Mozambique has become one of the world's natural gas hubs. Mozambican authorities are interested in expanding contacts with major Russian companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, and Novatek, notes Rui Verde.
Thus, Moscow is regaining its position in a country that controls important maritime corridors of the Indian Ocean, possesses vast gas reserves, and serves as a platform for all of Southern Africa, according to the researcher.
On the other hand, Rui Verde considers the DRC to be a more significant development from Angola's perspective. During the visit of President Félix Tshisekedi to Moscow, three cooperation agreements were signed between the DRC and Russia in the fields of economy, trade, science, and technology, as well as in healthcare and education. These documents institutionalize the strategic partnership between Moscow and Kinshasa.
In contrast, Russia had a relatively limited presence in the DRC compared to China, the US, or the European Union. Rui Verde points out that the DRC president presented his visit as part of a targeted strategy to diversify international alliances but also directly called on Russia to play a more active role in stabilizing the eastern part of the country.
'This represents a significant change. For decades, the main international interlocutors for the DRC on security matters have been Angola, the United States, France, Belgium, and the United Nations,' comments the analyst.
Angola, for its part, has gradually distanced itself from Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine, while significantly deepening cooperation with the United States and the European Union. The Lobito corridor has become the main symbol of this strategic reorientation.
'The Russian response now seems to be building a network of relationships around Angola,' observes Rui Verde, emphasizing that Angola has lost the privileged position it held for decades alongside Russia, especially during the Cold War when Angola may have been the Soviet Union's main ally in Africa.
However, the academic clarifies that this does not mean Angola faces a direct threat or immediate diplomatic isolation; rather, 'the evolution of the last week demonstrates that Moscow is developing regional alternatives' instead of relying on Angola as the primary partner in Southern Africa.
It appears that Russia is betting on a multi-pronged support strategy: Mozambique provides gas, access to the Indian Ocean, and military cooperation, while the DRC offers critical minerals, continental scale, and geographical centrality.
Rui Verde concludes that Russia is returning to Southern Africa through a regional strategy that is no longer dependent on Angola. He summarizes that 'before the general elections in 2027, Angola will be able to do little in terms of foreign policy. After that, it will have to evaluate its international paths and alliances in a rapidly changing world.'
