The existing route for global energy supplies, through which about 21 million barrels of oil pass daily, represents a critical point. The emergence of a crisis on this route affects not only gasoline and diesel prices but also the economy and industry worldwide. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 demonstrates the scale of this threat.
According to data from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), at the peak of the crisis, about 14% of global oil and gas supplies were affected. This effect was more than twice as large as during the major oil shocks of the 1970s and approximately six times greater than the disruptions caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022.
The significance of Hormuz is underscored by the fact that in the fourth quarter of 2025, about 21 million barrels of oil passed through the strait daily. This figure includes approximately 16 million barrels of crude oil and 5 million barrels of petroleum products. Thus, it is not just a sea route, but a key link in global energy trade.
Any major disruption here can simultaneously put pressure on the trade of oil, gas, and petroleum products. Nevertheless, during the crisis, the global market did not completely stop. The market was able to partially cope with the supply shock due to reduced consumption, the use of alternative routes, existing reserves, and changes in trade flows.
According to MGI estimates, about 45% of the volume of oil supplies that left the market during the crisis was compensated by reducing consumption. This is equivalent to approximately 6.8 million barrels per day. China reduced its oil imports, while the US increased its exports. This changed the flow of supplies in various parts of the world and brought some relief to the market. However, this entire situation clearly showed that the buffers available in the energy market are not infinite.
During the crisis, there was an increase in prices, a reduction in oil reserves, and increased strain on refineries. Alternative infrastructure provided some help but could not easily cover the entire deficit. An example of this was the disruption of the 'Vostok-Zapad' pipeline in Saudi Arabia. This pipeline is one of the main alternatives allowing passage around Hormuz, but problems with it demonstrated that alternative routes are also not entirely risk-free. That is, the presence of one pipeline or another shipping route does not guarantee energy security; its capacity, location, and connection to other infrastructure during a crisis are also important.
According to MGI, about two-thirds of global energy trade passes through maritime chokepoints. This is why a crisis on one important sea route can affect many regions of the world simultaneously. About 23 million barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through the Strait of Malacca daily, and then Hormuz is extremely important with a flow of about 21 million barrels per day.
Furthermore, the Kep-Mys-God-Hope, Suez Canal, Turkish Straits, Bab el-Mandeb, and Panama Canal are important for global energy trade. Recent tensions in the Red Sea and Yemen have also shown that as threats on sea routes increase, ships have to take longer routes, increasing both transit time and transportation costs.
India is among the largest energy importers in the world. Consequently, a crisis on such an important route as Hormuz can directly affect India's energy security. For India, the importance of diversifying crude oil supplies, strategic oil reserves, alternative shipping routes, domestic refining capacity, and the ability to switch between fuel types when necessary is increasing. Major global economies are also increasing investments in bypass pipelines, alternative oil and gas supplies, electrification, and diversification of energy sources.
MGI predicts that with these measures, by 2030, 35% to 70% of the oil flow passing through Hormuz can be covered in the event of a new major disruption. This corresponds to approximately 7–15 million barrels per day or 7–15% of global oil supplies. However, there are complexities here too. Pipelines connect specific locations and cannot be easily rerouted to another path in case of a crisis. On the other hand, reserve infrastructure may be used little in normal times, but its need increases sharply during a crisis.
Another dependency of India and China. According to MGI, India and China can cope with some shocks in oil and gas supplies due to the availability of coal. That is, if necessary, both countries can switch to other types of fuels to some extent. But the problem is that about 84% of the energy trade of both countries passes through maritime chokepoints. This means that despite the availability of alternative fuel, dependence on sea routes has not disappeared completely. Therefore, the issue of energy security is not only about how much oil or gas a country has, but also how safely it can deliver those supplies.
LNG prices have also heightened concerns.
