As the US and China compete for technological supremacy, Daryl Swanepoel of Inclusive Society notes that the implications for global surveillance and data privacy are becoming increasingly complex.
The discussion about Chinese technology largely boils down to whether Beijing can use telecommunication networks, cloud systems, AI platforms, or drones created in China for surveillance. Technically, this is possible. However, stopping at this level provides a dangerously incomplete picture, as the same question must be asked regarding the United States.
Modern digital technologies are not politically neutral infrastructure. Telecommunication equipment processes traffic and metadata. Cloud providers store information and control access to computing power. Drone platforms collect images, coordinates, and flight data. AI companies process queries, documents, and organizational data. Manufacturers can alter the behavior of these systems through software and firmware updates.
Any state capable of coercing, compromising, or cooperating with companies managing these technologies potentially has access to valuable information. This holds true regardless of whether the provider is Chinese, American, or from any other country.
Western concerns about China are not unfounded. Article 7 of China's National Intelligence Law requires organizations and citizens to support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence work. State-sponsored cyber operations against telecommunications infrastructure and critical assets by China have also been documented. In a joint advisory document released in 2025 by the United States and international partners, it was described how China-linked actors compromised networks worldwide to support a spying system.
Technical risks are equally plausible. Telecommunication equipment contains remotely supported software, and internet-connected drones can transmit images, location data, and telemetry. Joint guidance from the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the FBI warns that drones manufactured in China could create pathways for data leakage from an organization, and manufacturer-controlled updates could introduce previously unknown data collection functions.
These are legitimate grounds for scrutiny. However, this is not proof that every Chinese product contains a hidden backdoor, or that all data passing through Chinese equipment is automatically sent to Beijing. British authorities examining Huawei equipment have repeatedly found serious flaws in software development and security. Nevertheless, an official report by the Huawei Cyber Security Assessment Centre Oversight Board in 2019 stated that the identified defects were not believed to be the result of interference by the Chinese state. Similarly, some technical assessments of Chinese drones found vulnerabilities, while other controlled tests did not reveal unexpected data transmission. It is important to understand that capability, vulnerability, and proven exploitation are different concepts.