For Iran, BRICS represents not just an economic union, but also a vast market, as well as a network of financial, commercial, and transit routes, the activation of which can open a new chapter in the country's foreign trade.
According to Mehr News Agency, Iran is participating in the BRICS summit in India during a period when the group has become one of the most important trade centers of the Global South. The UN Conference on Trade and Development reports that the volume of merchandise exports of BRICS members reached about $6 trillion in 2024, and imports amounted to approximately $5 trillion, with intra-group trade increasing to $1.2 trillion.
These figures demonstrate that for Iran, BRICS is not only a political alliance but also a collection of large consumer, manufacturing, energy-exporting economies, and capital market owners. In 2024, Iran also became a full member of the group alongside China, India, Russia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa.
In fact, even before official accession, Iran conducted a significant part of its foreign trade with BRICS member countries. Data published in the BRICS economic bulletin shows that Iran's customs exports to BRICS countries reached about $23.7 billion in the Iranian year 1403 (which ended in March 2025), while imports from these countries during the same period amounted to approximately $38.8 billion.
Thus, Iran's trade with BRICS, while a potential opportunity, is already an important part of the country's economic reality. The main question is how much Iran's membership in this group can change the quality of this trade.
The problem in Iran's trade with BRICS countries is not only about finding buyers or sellers; in many cases, the main difficulty is related to money transfers, transaction costs, insurance, transportation, banking restrictions, and sanction risks. From this perspective, the importance of BRICS' financial direction for Iran is no less than the increase in trade volume.
One of the key economic topics at this year's BRICS summit was the development of payment systems and reducing friction in exchanges between members. India, which is chairing BRICS in 2026, is promoting a proposal to connect the central bank digital currencies of group members to facilitate cross-border payments. This plan continues BRICS' efforts to enhance the compatibility of participants' payment systems.
The importance of this issue is obvious for Iran. Any mechanism that can reduce the cost and time of settling foreign trade directly affects the ability to expand exports and imports. However, this path still faces serious obstacles. Reuters reported geopolitical disagreements among members and even the cessation of financial relations between Iran and the UAE, as well as the need for currency swap mechanisms to manage trade imbalances, which complicates the realization of such plans.
Therefore, expectations from BRICS should not be about creating a 'common currency' or instantly eliminating the dollar; rather, in the short term, a more practical achievement will be reducing settlement costs, wider use of local currencies, and establishing payment systems.
Among BRICS members, China remains Iran's most important trading partner. World Trade Organization data shows that in 2024, China accounted for 26 percent of Iran's imports and 26 percent of its exports. But this high concentration has a downside: if BRICS is to become a tool for diversifying Iran's foreign trade, simply increasing exchanges with China is not enough.
India, Russia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other group members have different markets and potential, and expanding trade with them can reduce Iran's excessive dependence on a few limited partners.
Of course, the situation in India differs from that in China. Trade between Iran and India in recent years has been constrained by sanctions and secondary pressure from the United States, and bilateral trade lags significantly behind the expected level compared to the potential of the two economies. Reuters also reported in an August report on the decline of trade between India and Iran under US pressure, describing India's trade with Iran as mainly limited to certain foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals.
From this perspective, Iran's participation in the summit in India became an opportunity to rethink these trade relations—not only at the Tehran-Delhi level but within the broader BRICS structure.
Iran's potential within BRICS is not limited to goods exports. The country's geographical location, especially at the junction of Russia and North Eurasia with southern waters and the Indian market, is another important advantage. Before the trip to India, the Minister of Economy stated that strengthening the North-South Corridor, along with developing financial and trade cooperation with Russia, is one of the axes of the government's economic diplomacy.
A conversation with Mehr reporters with economic figures confirmed this view: this issue is particularly important from a trade perspective, because if Iran can simultaneously act as a producer, exporter, and transit route, the economic value of BRICS membership for the country will multiply manifold.
According to economic experts, in such a model, goods are not only exported from Iran to a BRICS member state; some trade between BRICS members may also pass through Iran. The North-South Corridor gains particular significance because India, as one of the major BRICS economies, needs diverse access routes to Russian and Eurasian markets, and Iran has a privileged geographical position in this regard.
Despite all these opportunities, one fact cannot be ignored: BRICS membership itself does not create trade. The experience of other members also shows that even trade between BRICS countries, despite noticeable growth, faces structural obstacles; for example, India's trade with BRICS has grown in recent years, but the trade deficit of India with the group reached about $226 billion in the 2026 fiscal year, indicating that increased trade does not necessarily mean balanced trade or equal benefits for members.
Economic experts believe that for Iran, the problem is not just about increasing trade indicators; it is necessary to assess what impact this trade will have on non-resource exports, raw material and equipment imports, investments, technology transfer, and currency income. In this system, if BRICS only leads to an increase in Iran's imports from member countries, it cannot be considered a trade success. The main goal should be to create greater balance, increase exports with higher added value, and attract capital for export-oriented production.
Iran's presence at this year's summit occurred against the backdrop of the global economic atmosphere being subjected to unprecedented influence from sanctions, trade wars, financial restrictions, and disruption of transport routes. At the same time, the Iran-US war and events in the Strait of Hormuz placed BRICS itself before an unprecedented test. Reuters reported that the current crisis has affected even trade relations between two BRICS members, Iran and the UAE, and that the UAE suspended trade with Iran in August.
This development clearly indicates to Iran that BRICS is not yet a free trade zone or an integrated economic union. Members have different and sometimes conflicting interests, and it cannot be expected that mere membership in this group will lift Iran's trade restrictions. Nevertheless, it is precisely this reality that enhances the importance of Iran's economic negotiations within this structure.
If Iran can leverage the potential of BRICS to create payment routes, use local currencies, finance projects, develop transit corridors, and expand trade agreements, membership in this group can transform from a diplomatic achievement into a real tool of foreign trade. Otherwise, despite the multi-trillion-dollar BRICS market, a significant part of this membership's potential will remain only on paper.
Therefore, sheer size is not enough to improve Iran's trade process; it is necessary to determine what share of this bloc's trade Iran can gain and, more importantly, what mechanism it can use to move the money received from this trade, and even more importantly, for BRICS to move from the level of political statements to the level of contracts, payments, investments, and real trade turnover.
