According to a new study published ahead of the BRICS Summit, China supplied at least 80 percent of India's imports across 71 product lines in the electronics sector during the 2025–26 period. This dependency is concentrated on high-level key components such as motors, cables, and switching equipment, rather than finished products.
The study showed that the number of such product lines increased from 44 in 2018–19 to 71 in 2025–26, representing a growth of over 60 percent. The report, prepared jointly by Koan Advisory Group and the Institute of Chinese Studies, analyzes bilateral trade at the level of individual product lines, starting with electrical and electronic equipment according to Harmonized System (HS) Chapter 85.
Of the 71 tariff lines where China's supply share exceeded 80 percent, 46 reached this threshold only after 2018–19, indicating an increasing concentration of India's imports over time. The report notes that the large number of tariff lines in the 90–99 percent range underscores the deep integration of Chinese sources into India's electronics imports.
The dependency is focused on a narrow set of core components that power telecommunications infrastructure, consumer electronics, and industrial equipment across the economy. The report characterizes this imbalance as long-term. It points out that India's trade deficit with China is structural, not cyclical, remaining in the same major HS chapters and continuing to grow.
The scale of this imbalance is significant: India's total trade deficit with China reached $112.1 billion in 2025–26, with only electrical equipment accounting for $43.1 billion, which is approximately 38 percent of the total. Although HS 85 is India's largest export chapter to China at $3.18 billion, this figure is minor compared to imports in the same category.
Lithium-ion batteries have become a key point of pressure. India's imports from China in this area more than doubled from 2021–22 to $3.9 billion, with China's share rising to 83.6 percent, exceeding the 80 percent dependency threshold for the first time in 2025–26. The report notes that this sharp increase indicates lithium-ion batteries as an emerging area of strategic dependence for India's electronics and electric mobility ecosystem.
Furthermore, the study found that China supplied 48.9 percent of India's semiconductor imports, even though its share decreased from approximately 64 percent the previous year. The report argues that such dependency cannot be eliminated by restricting imports because the problem lies in high-level components, not finished products. It concludes that as long as components feeding into Indian assembly lines almost entirely originate from China, the deficit in this chapter will be structurally entrenched, regardless of domestic electronics production growth.
Instead, the report calls for policy development that prioritizes the localization of high-level component manufacturing, supported by India's critical minerals strategy, as well as creating a balanced framework for selectively allowing Chinese manufacturers to operate within India in segments where domestic alternatives remain unviable. In conclusion, the report stated that the ultimate goal is a balanced transition from constant import dependency to locally integrated manufacturing capabilities.