Brazilian journalist believes BRICS unites peoples and markets

BRICS nations are seeking a way to conduct trade settlements among themselves, bypassing the need to route every transaction through the US dollar. BRICSCOIN represents one specific answer to this problem: it is a settlement instrument that is not a national currency, is not pegged to gold, and is not a digital token. Central banks can use it exclusively for settling trade balances.

This instrument combines physical and digital components and is issued only with the unanimous consent of the central banks of the BRICS countries. It is neither paper nor purely digital currency.

The new BRICSCOIN is minted only by the unanimous decision of the Issuing Council, which includes one representative from each founding central bank: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. There is no possibility of majority voting or an algorithmic issuance rule; one dissenting participant can block the process. This is a conscious trade-off of flexibility for legitimacy, as there is no supranational body that could force a reluctant member to accept a distribution they deem unfair; unanimity is the only principle consistent with a system lacking a higher appellate authority.

The limitations of BRICSCOIN are equally important. Unlike the Keynesian bank of 1943 (which was defined relative to gold) or the IMF Special Drawing Rights (which are valued based on a basket of currencies), BRICSCOIN has no anchor, is not backed by reserves, and contains no promise of convertibility. The formula for determining the value of one unit can be disputed by a member, but BRICSCOIN bypasses this issue instead of providing an answer to it.

Each coin consists of a certified diamond embedded in a disc. This disc undergoes a computed tomography scan (CT-scan) to record the unique location of internal inclusions at the time the stone formed—a physical fingerprint that cannot be altered or reproduced. This fingerprint is hashed and identically registered in a ledger maintained by all five central banks, with no master copy existing. Thus, any participant can verify the authenticity of the coin without trusting the party currently holding it. The ledger answers only one question: is this coin genuine? And it is never updated when the coin is transferred. Transactions are private, bilateral, off-ledger events, more akin to transferring a gold coin than to a blockchain transfer.

The market value of the diamond itself is insignificant compared to the value of the coin—each BRICSCOIN is valued at approximately $1 million, far exceeding the cost of the stone inside. This is because the diamond does not serve as collateral for this value; its function is to make the coin non-reproducible. This consensus-driven physical construction allows for something that a paper reserve currency structurally cannot do: it prevents the penetration of one member's domestic monetary policy into the assets of the others. When a country holds another country's currency as its asset for settlement, it inherits that issuer's inflation. If the issuer increases its own money supply, the balance of every foreign holder quietly depreciates along with it, regardless of whether they participated in the decision.

Thus, the issuer of the reserve currency exports its inflation to everyone who holds its money. The BRICSCOIN is not a balance requirement of any member, and no member can unilaterally create more such coins. New coins require the signatures of all five participants, and after minting, the coin becomes a fixed physical object, not a ledger entry that the central bank can inflate. The coin itself is a settlement instrument, similar to how gold was money in itself, not a claim on money. Neither importer nor exporter touches the coin: the importer buys BRICSCOIN from its central bank for payment, and its central bank transfers the coins to the exporter's central bank, and the exporter's central bank credits the exporter with funds in local currency—the physical coins move only between banks.

A settlement instrument without interest or pegging has one structural weakness: if one side of a trade relationship consistently runs a one-way deficit, that country simply depletes its coin reserves, and there is no market mechanism to automatically correct the imbalance. Solving this problem for uneven relationships is a complex task best postponed until the institution gains some operational experience. A more practical starting point is the opposite type of relationship: bilateral trade that is already close to balance, where transactions in both directions roughly offset each other, and neither side's reserves deviate too far in either direction.

Recent data on bilateral trade among the ten full members of BRICS+ indicates exactly such a starting point. Among the most balanced relationships in the bloc are the three largest and most strategically important.

Trade between China and Russia serves as a natural anchor, amounting to $245 billion with only a 6% imbalance, proving the mechanism's viability with real volume, not just as a symbolic gesture. Trade between India and South Africa, which amounts to less than $16 billion, presents a reverse test—small enough that an early miscalculation would not lead to major losses, making it a reasonable place to practice the process and verify before scaling up. Relations between Brazil and India are in the middle: they are large, transcontinental, and have already been discussed as a target for reducing the share of the dollar in settlements.

It is worth considering a second tier of nearly balanced pairs for a subsequent phase, as well as one pair included as a deliberate contrast.

The core argument in favor of BRICSCOIN is not its simultaneous launch across the entire bloc. It lies in selecting corridors where the mechanism can prove its worth without major risks—truly balanced trade, moderate volume, ready counterparties—and allowing the institution to gain trust before being asked to solve more complex cases. China–Russia, India–South Africa, and Brazil–India are precisely such starting points based on metrics.

BRICS countries have intensified joint work in the field of space technologies, expanding the scope of interaction from general satellite projects to broader data exchange, disaster monitoring, and climate change response.

A significant step was the first meeting of the BRICS Joint Committee on Space Cooperation, held on May 25, 2022. Representatives from the space agencies of the five original BRICS members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—participated, officially establishing the cooperation mechanism.

The goal of this committee is to strengthen interaction between the space agencies of BRICS countries and promote the use of Earth remote sensing data in areas such as environmental protection, disaster prevention and mitigation, and climate change response. Through improved data exchange and application, this mechanism is expected to provide a new impetus to sustainable economic and social development in all BRICS countries.

This cooperation is based on an initiative put forward by China in 2015 to create a BRICS remote sensing satellite constellation. In August 2021, the five space agencies of BRICS countries signed an agreement defining the 'six satellites, five ground stations' cooperation model.

This constellation includes six existing satellites from member countries, including the Gaofen-6 and Ziyuan-3 02 satellites from China, the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 04 (CBERS-04), the Kanopus-V type satellite from Russia, and the Resourcesat-2 and Resourcesat-2A satellites from India. Each country has its own ground receiving station.

According to the China National Space Administration (CNSA), this constellation was developed to better support the socio-economic development of BRICS countries, ensure wider access to common satellite imagery data for the five nations, and enhance data processing capabilities. Furthermore, the constellation will help build high-quality partnerships among BRICS countries.

CNSA noted that Earth remote sensing technology, due to its wide coverage, high resolution, and global observation capabilities, is becoming an increasingly important tool for solving global challenges of the 21st century, such as food security and water resource management.

The China-Brazil Earth Resources Program (CBERS), launched over three decades ago, is considered a model of South-South scientific and technical cooperation. The CBERS series, jointly developed by China and Brazil, includes six satellites. Currently operational CBERS-04 and CBERS-04A satellites support applications such as weather monitoring, forest protection, and disaster prevention. This program also contributes to broader BRICS cooperation in remote sensing.

BRICS countries are also expanding cooperation in satellite navigation. In 2026, China and Russia committed to implementing a roadmap for cooperation for the period 2026–2030 in the field of satellite navigation, enhancing compatibility between China's BeiDou navigation system and Russia's GLONASS system.

China has also cooperated with South Africa to promote the application of BeiDou systems and global navigation satellite systems in fields such as precision agriculture, transport and logistics, and public safety.

Expanding Cooperation to Solve Global Problems

At the meeting of the heads of BRICS space agencies (HOSA) in Bangalore, India, in June 2026, representatives of the expanded BRICS membership—including Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates—discussed further strengthening cooperation in peaceful space exploration and the long-term sustainability of space activities.

Delegations discussed the potential for BRICS cooperation in using space technologies to solve global problems, especially in the areas of remote sensing, disaster management, and climate change. Progress was also made at this meeting in amending the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation Agreement to include new members, and details of the proposed BRICS Space Council were discussed.

Strengthening International Cooperation in Space Data

China emphasized the importance of space cooperation by providing broader access to satellite data technologies and applications. Li Guoping, Chief Engineer of CNSA, stated at the International Air and Space Forum in Wenchang, Hainan, in August 2026, that CNSA will continue to promote open and inclusive space cooperation by expanding international interaction in satellite data applications, creating secure and efficient cross-border remote sensing platforms, and supporting countries, especially developing ones, in enhancing their space capabilities.

Li also reported that CNSA will strengthen cooperation through multilateral mechanisms such as the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation, facilitate exchange in space personnel development, and work with international partners on issues such as space traffic management and long-term sustainability of outer space.