Iran and Vietnam are working to overcome barriers to expand bilateral trade

Iran plans to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek in 2026 to deepen economic integration with Eurasian partners, promote the process of de-dollarization, and expand trade and transport links.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in the capital of Kyrgyzstan on Monday for the two-day summit. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghi. The visit includes participation in SCO and SCO Plus meetings, as well as a series of bilateral talks with heads of member states.

The 2026 summit marks the 25th anniversary of the SCO and will bring together leaders from China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Belarus, and Central Asian countries. Turkey is also participating as a dialogue partner. Since its establishment, the organization has significantly expanded: the combined GDP of its members grew from approximately $1.67 trillion in 2001 to about $25 trillion in 2025, according to accompanying reports.

However, for Tehran, this summit holds significance beyond multilateral diplomacy. Iran aims to transform its membership in the organization into practical economic mechanisms that can reduce vulnerability to sanctions and strengthen access to regional markets.

De-dollarization in the economic agenda

One of Tehran's key proposals is the establishment of a Shanghai Development Bank, whose charter capital would be based on the national currencies of member states and supported by independent systems for conducting trade and financial settlements.

This proposal was presented during discussions between finance ministers and central bank governors in Bishkek. According to the plan, the institution could help finance infrastructure projects, especially in the energy and transport sectors, as well as along major regional corridors.

Iranian officials view this initiative as part of broader efforts to reduce dependence on the US dollar and create alternative channels for trade and finance. Hassan Kashqavi, spokesperson for the Iranian Parliament's National Security Commission, noted that the continued dominance of the dollar remains a source of economic pressure on Iran, but stated that sanctions have not deprived Tehran of options.

It is expected that this proposal will be submitted to the SCO Secretariat for further consideration.

Energy and transit links with Central Asia

Pezeshkian's meeting with Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov highlighted Tehran's efforts to turn political ties into tangible economic projects. The Iranian President welcomed Bishkek's proposal to establish a joint oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan and announced that Iran is ready to supply the crude oil needed for this facility and share the resulting petroleum products with Kyrgyzstan.

Pezeshkian also proposed establishing a logistics center for Kyrgyzstan in Iran's Bandar Abbas port. This facility could provide Kyrgyzstan with a route to the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, and East Asian markets, while also allowing other members of the Eurasian Economic Union to more actively utilize Iran's transport infrastructure and gain access to international waters.

Japarov welcomed the expansion of economic and energy cooperation and invited Iranian oil exploration companies to contribute their technical expertise to projects in Kyrgyzstan. These discussions reflect Iran's broader strategy to position itself as a transit and energy hub between landlocked Central Asian countries and international maritime markets.

India as a key economic partner

Pezeshkian's talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi were particularly significant against the backdrop of regional tensions and sanctions. The Iranian President emphasized the vast potential for cooperation between Tehran and New Delhi in economic, political, scientific, and cultural spheres, asserting that closer bilateral relations could help mitigate the effects of sanctions.

The leaders also discussed transport and maritime cooperation, events surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, and progress at Iran's Chabahar port, which is one of the country's key gateways to the Indian Ocean. Pezeshkian thanked India for its cooperation with Iran during the recent conflict between the US and Israel and called for more decisive diplomatic efforts to restore peace and stability in the region.

He reiterated Tehran's position that Iran is not seeking war, and that regional disputes should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation. He also strongly urged India to leverage its connections with various parties to promote a shift from confrontation to diplomacy. Modi affirmed India's commitment to strengthening long-standing relations with Iran and expressed readiness to expand and diversify bilateral trade. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs described the meeting as 'fruitful' and confirmed New Delhi's stance that unresolved disputes must be settled through dialogue and diplomacy.

Broader Eurasian diplomacy

Pezeshkian also held talks with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. Both meetings focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation and more effectively utilizing existing economic and political opportunities.

These meetings are part of Iran's broader diplomatic push across Eurasia, where Iran seeks to expand trade, energy cooperation, transport links, and strategic partnerships. Iranian officials also stressed that Tehran's defense cooperation with other countries is aimed at strengthening regional security, not targeting neighboring states. Pezeshkian described regional security as a collective responsibility and argued that closer cooperation among regional states is the most sustainable way to prevent external interference.

Thus, the SCO summit provides Iran with a platform that unites diplomacy, economy, and security during a period of large-scale geopolitical restructuring. The organization now represents a significant portion of the world's population and economy, with its members increasingly striving to strengthen economic cooperation outside of Western-dominated financial structures.

For Tehran, the priority is transforming this emerging structure into tangible economic opportunities—from alternative payment mechanisms and infrastructure financing to energy partnerships and transit corridors. As the SCO celebrates its 25th anniversary, Iran positions itself as an active participant in the organization's evolving economic architecture, seeking to use multilateral cooperation to mitigate the impact of sanctions, diversify trade, and strengthen its role as a link between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the wider Asian market. The summit is expected to result in the adoption of the Bishkek Declaration and a number of agreements covering areas such as security, energy, transport, and digital development, further underscoring the organization's growing role in the emerging Eurasian order.

Sobh-e-No analyzes Iran's three-pronged strategy in response to increased economic sanctions from the United States. The economic blockade has reached a new stage, and Tehran is attempting to manage the crisis by using a combination of negotiations, heightened tension, and economic confrontation.

In practice, Iran is not limited only to diplomacy and economic resilience; it is also putting military and defense options on the table as part of its broader strategy. The concept of the 'Tehran Strategic Triangle' implies maintaining defensive readiness, balancing between threat and engagement, strengthening regional cooperation, coordinating with eastern powers, and controlling the domestic economy.

Overall, within this strategic triangle, military means are not the primary choice, but they serve as serious support for diplomacy and economic resistance, allowing Iran to navigate any possible scenario.

What is Asim Munir looking for in Tehran?

Shargh notes that Asim Munir's visit to Iran occurs during a period when the regional situation and relations between Tehran and Washington are in one of the most complex and exhausting phases. The continuation of confrontation, combined with the US economic war against Iran and growing pressure on Iran's internal economy and livelihoods, has created a picture of an uncertain and risky future.

The visit by the head of the Pakistani army cannot be viewed merely as a bilateral meeting or routine military-political protocol. One theory suggests that the trip may help resume communication channels and reduce political distance to revive understanding with Islamabad. However, another scenario cannot be ignored: Islamabad might be conveying harsh warnings from Trump to Tehran or relaying external players' concerns regarding the direction of current events.

Islamic Unity and Regional Security

Jam-e-Jam, citing former diplomat Mohsen Pak-Aien, discusses the diplomacy of Islamic unity. This diplomacy aims to strengthen ties with Muslims worldwide and Islamic states to increase common ground and reduce disagreements.

Given the war imposed by the US and Israel against Iran, as well as the increasing need for regional security, which regional states must provide themselves, the conditions for achieving Islamic unity have become more favorable than before. Arab and Muslim countries now believe that US military bases and presence cannot guarantee their security. Instead, Islamic states must achieve common regional security by strengthening unity. Such unity can pave the way for a new world order based on multilateralism and resistance to US dominance.

Javan analyzes the decline of the UAE's role in Iran's foreign trade. Contrary to some fears, this decline does not necessarily mean a deficit or a halt in imports. Iran is capable of reconfiguring trade routes and importing the same goods directly from the source or through alternative paths. The key point is that Iran's foreign trade should not depend on the decisions of a single regional center. It is important that the substitution strategy does not generate new dependencies. The goal is not to find 'second UAEs,' but to create a network of multiple routes so that the closure of one path does not disrupt national trade. Thus, eliminating the shadow of the UAE does not mean ending trade with them; it means eliminating dependence. The UAE can remain one of Iran's partners. The current situation provides an opportunity to reduce this long-standing dependency and build trade based on multiple routes, partners, and financial mechanisms—a shift that ultimately reduces Iran's external trade risk.

Hamshahri asserts that what is forming between Iran and the US resembles a mix of maximum pressure and forced diplomacy rather than a clear start to new negotiations. Washington is raising the price of avoiding the negotiating table, while mediators try to keep the path to dialogue open. The next 24–48 hours will be decisive. If Tehran announces its readiness to continue negotiations until the full entry into force of new sanctions, it will strengthen the hypothesis that Washington is using 'Economic Day Zero' as leverage in negotiations. But if the sanctions package is implemented without a pause or concessions, and Iran responds with tightening restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, it will signal the failure of forced diplomacy in achieving a compromise between Tehran and Washington, pushing the crisis into a new phase of military-economic escalation.

Performative Independence

Siasat-e-Rooz argues that Ukraine's Independence Day has become a symbol of Western dependence. Europe, masquerading as aid, exploits Ukraine, while Ukraine itself has lost its nuclear and military capabilities by trusting Western promises. In contrast, Iran is presented as genuinely independent, relying on its own military power and the geostrategic influence of the Strait of Hormuz. This has allowed Iran to shape a new regional order, whereas Ukraine, despite its sensitive geopolitical position, has become a tool in the hands of the West and does not control the beginning or end of its own war.