Water resources are available in Central Asia, but the region is facing challenges in preparing for periods of scarcity. Nearly four out of five residents of Central Asia depend on transboundary water systems. In some parts of the region, severe droughts occur every five to six years, and the water supply sector requires investments of up to $2.6 billion.
The question has shifted from how much water will remain in the region to whether the infrastructure can function with reduced available water resources.
Central Asia is already aware of many of its vulnerabilities
The water dispute in Central Asia is entering a new phase. The region no longer lacks data on increasing climatic pressure. The more complex question is whether institutions, infrastructure, and investments can adapt quickly enough to the risks already emerging in water resource management, agriculture, and energy.
Estimates presented at the Regional Environmental Summit (RES-2026) and the Climate Change Conference in Central Asia (CACCC-2026) in Astana demonstrate the scale of this vulnerability. Approximately 81% of the region's population depends on transboundary water systems originating in the Tian Shan and Pamir-Alai mountains. However, the degree of dependence of individual countries on water flowing across their national borders varies significantly. This turns the water security issue into a regional infrastructure challenge that cannot be solved by the internal policies of individual states alone.
This dependence is particularly high in downstream countries. According to estimates presented at the conferences, external water dependence reaches 97% in Turkmenistan and about 80% in Uzbekistan; Kazakhstan is also significantly dependent on transboundary inflows.
These figures are important because they show the limits of purely national adaptation: a country can modernize canals, pumping stations, and reservoirs, but the overall reliability of the system will depend on processes occurring upstream.
Drought must be planned as a recurring systemic risk
The need to change the management model becomes even clearer when drought is viewed not as an exceptional emergency, but as a recurring condition that must be included in planning. According to estimates from the International Institute for Water Resources Management, approximately 30% of Central Asia's territory has a 50% or higher probability of drought. In some areas, severe droughts recur every five to six years, and drought is responsible for up to 70% of the total number of people affected by emergencies in the region.
At such a frequency, responding only after a crisis begins is a costly strategy. Governments and basin organizations must know in advance what indicators trigger emergency measures, how reservoir operating regimes will change, how competing needs of agriculture and energy will be balanced, and what information countries commit to providing. Without pre-agreed procedures, every low-water year risks turning into another round of negotiations under political and economic pressure.
The consequences for infrastructure are equally important. Drought preparedness is not just about forecasting. It requires systems for water storage and transport capable of operating under greater variability, digital monitoring, reliable hydrological and meteorological data, and irrigation networks capable of reducing preventable losses. In other words, climate adaptation increasingly needs to be integrated directly into the physical and operational architecture of water resource management.
Transboundary dependence creates a problem of economic incentives
The geography of Central Asia's water resources generates a constant mismatch between where costs arise and where benefits are realized. Upstream countries maintain reservoirs and hydropower infrastructure capable of regulating river flow, while downstream economies benefit significantly from summer water releases for irrigation. As climate variability increases, fixed allocation mechanisms become less sustainable, as the economic value of water storage, timing of releases, and flow regulation also changes.
At CACCC-2026, former Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan, Alikbek Jeksenkulov, highlighted this asymmetry from Kyrgyzstan's perspective: Kyrgyzstan generates approximately 47% of the Syr Darya flow through the Naryn and Karadarya river systems, while receiving less than 2% of the basin's flow allocated by existing mechanisms. Regardless of the political interpretation of these figures, the core problem is clear: cooperation becomes complicated when the costs of providing regional water services and the resulting economic benefits are distributed among different parties.
This is why projects like the Kambarat-1 HPP are important not only for power generation. Joint investments can create a platform where countries can more clearly define the value of water storage, seasonal regulation, energy supply, and downstream water reliability. The goal is not to commodify water itself, but to make the services created by coordinated infrastructure measurable enough for negotiations on cost sharing, responsibilities, and benefits.
The investment gap is becoming part of the water security problem
Physical infrastructure will also require significantly more capital. According to regional assessments presented at RES-2026, Central Asia's water sector faces a financial deficit of about $2–$2.6 billion. The aging of irrigation infrastructure exacerbates the problem: in some Kazakh systems, irrigation efficiency remains around 55%, and water losses can reach 40%.
This data shows that the region's adaptation task is not just a lack of projects. It is also a problem of financing and project preparation. Modernization competes for capital amid regulatory uncertainty, currency risks, limited access to long-term financing, and underdeveloped risk-sharing mechanisms. Tools discussed at the conferences that could help close this gap include climate guarantees, green investment funds, enhanced ESG disclosure, blended finance, and Islamic finance instruments.
The scale of the broader investment agenda is already substantial. According to a regional presentation at CACCC-2026, the World Bank's active portfolio in Central Asia includes 79 projects with total commitments of about $10.3 billion. Regional programs cover areas such as water security, power grid connection, land restoration, and climate resilience. A growing question is whether individual investments can be structured as components of an integrated regional adaptation system rather than as isolated national projects.
Cooperation has economic value—as does its absence
Ultimately, economics can provide the strongest argument for a more practical regional model. According to World Bank estimates presented at CACCC-2026, insufficient cooperation in water resource management costs Central Asia at least $4.5 billion in lost revenue. Meanwhile, expanded regional electricity trade could bring at least $15 billion in economic benefits.
These figures should not be viewed as directly comparable categories. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the same fundamental principle: coordination has measurable economic value. Joint infrastructure, electricity trade, reservoir management, and drought planning can create benefits that individual national systems cannot achieve as effectively on their own.
This also changes the approach to adaptation itself. Regional cooperation is often seen as a diplomatic goal, whereas infrastructure is perceived as a technical investment issue. In Central Asia, these two aspects are becoming increasingly difficult to separate. Reservoir operation modes, cross-border power lines, common drought indicators, or irrigation modernization programs can alter the distribution of climate risk and economic value among countries.
Adaptation requires a working model, not another declaration
Central Asia is not devoid of regional institutions or political dialogue. The more complex task is to turn cooperation into systems that continue to function under conditions of water scarcity. This requires common data standards, agreed-upon drought thresholds, transparent reservoir operating rules, investment portfolios, financing mechanisms, and a clear division of responsibilities before a crisis hits. These practical elements are embedded in the logic of the decisions presented at the conferences.
The region's climate future will be determined by glacier retreat, changes in river flow, extreme heat, and increasingly unstable drought conditions. However, the economic consequences will depend not only on the volume of available water but also on how effectively it is stored, transported, distributed, and managed across borders.
Central Asia's main risk today is no longer the lack of information about impending water scarcity. The scale of transboundary dependence, the recurrence of droughts, infrastructure losses, and the investment gap are largely known. Now, something else will be tested: the ability of governments to prepare the system before the next period of low water turns into a crisis. Canals and reservoirs must function with more variable flow, water allocation rules must remain resilient under scarcity, and investment mechanisms must fund projects before, not after, an emergency occurs.
The cost of delay is already measured in cubic meters of water. According to the World Bank, insufficient cooperation in water resource management deprives Central Asia of at least $4.5 billion in economic benefits. Therefore, the next stage of regional adaptation will be determined not by the number of new cooperation declarations, but by whether its infrastructure and agreements can withstand the next serious water deficit.