Representatives of the Iranian Health Insurance Organization and the ICOPH Committee Discuss Strengthening Ties

Some Western and regional media outlets have attempted to emphasize alleged disagreements between the military and political leadership of Iran following the appointment of Major General Mohsen Rezaei as secretary of the country's highest security body. President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Rezaei, an experienced military commander and political figure, as the new secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on Sunday.

This move followed the Iranian Leader, Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Khamenei, designating Rezaei as his representative in the SNSC—the country's highest decision-making body responsible for developing and coordinating defense, security, and foreign policy.

However, rather than signaling a rift between Iran's political and military establishment, Rezaei's appointment can be viewed as a demonstration of closer institutional coordination during a period when Iran faces ongoing external pressure and delicate negotiations regarding the region's future.

Rezaei replaced Mohammad Bagher Zolghadre, who has now been appointed as the Leader's political advisor. Previously, Zolghadre succeeded Ali Larijani, who was killed in an American-Israeli strike in March.

Rezaei takes up his post in the SNSC amid current negotiations between Iran and Oman concerning the Strait of Hormuz—a strategic waterway over which Iran has maintained sovereign control since the joint US and Israeli aggression on February 28.

The Strait of Hormuz remains at the center of a broader confrontation between Tehran and Washington, with Iran repeatedly asserting that control over this waterway is a matter of national sovereignty and strategic security, not subject to external dictates.

Rezaei himself has particularly emphasized Iran's control over this strategic waterway. Last week, he warned the United States that it would 'face serious risks and losses' if the American blockade of Iranian ports continued. In July, he stated even more categorically that control over the Strait of Hormuz is worth more than 'dozens of atomic bombs.'

Some foreign media and analysts interpreted such statements as evidence that Rezaei's appointment could strengthen the positions of those within Iran who oppose diplomacy with Washington. However, this interpretation ignores the overall stance of the Iranian leadership, which has repeatedly combined a willingness to engage in dialogue with a clear demand that diplomacy must not come at the expense of sovereignty, security, or the country's right to self-defense against aggression.

The narrative of a struggle between so-called 'moderates' and 'hardliners' is not new. It has long been used by Washington and some regional allies in an attempt to portray Iran's political system as divided into competing camps that can be manipulated.

Iranian political and military officials have repeatedly rejected this concept, describing it as a form of psychological warfare designed to obscure the reality that the country's main institutions can maintain a common strategic position despite differences in political style and approach.

This same story resurfaced after Rezaei's appointment, especially after the US and Israeli military campaign failed to achieve its stated goals in Iran. The thirty-nine-day war, which began on February 28 and was paused by a ceasefire on April 8, did not yield the expected result for Washington and Tel Aviv.

The consequences of this failure were acknowledged, directly or indirectly, by Western political figures. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated at the end of April that the United States had been 'humiliated' in the war with Iran. Similar assessments also emerged in US political circles. Democratic Senator Chris Murphy stated on Sunday that President Donald Trump 'lost this war' to Iran. 'America is weaker. Iran is stronger,' Murphy told NBC.

Against this backdrop, attempts to interpret Rezaei's appointment as proof of internal power struggles in Iran seem increasingly detached from the country's institutional reality.

Some commentators also presented this appointment as evidence of a growing rift between Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and President Pezeshkian. Nevertheless, such an interpretation largely disregards the significance of the institutional process through which Rezaei was promoted to this position. His new role followed coordination between the Leader and the president, including their recent meeting, and should therefore be understood in the context of their cooperation.

Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Khamenei has already characterized Pezeshkian as a wise and honest president with an understanding of the situation, emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the presidency and other state institutions at a critical moment for the country.

Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi all supported diplomacy and stressed the need to translate Iran's military achievements during the recent confrontation into sustainable political and legal successes. At the same time, they made it clear that diplomacy should not be confused with weakness. They warned that Iran would respond with a crushing blow to any renewed act of aggression by the United States or Israel.

This position does not fundamentally differ from that expressed by Rezaei. Thus, the difference is not between proponents of diplomacy and proponents of confrontation. Rather, the emerging position in Tehran is that diplomacy and deterrence are complementary tools of national power: negotiations can take place when they serve Iran's interests, while military readiness remains necessary to prevent diplomacy from becoming a tool of coercion.

This is particularly important as Tehran and Washington face unresolved issues stemming from the conflict and the US violation of the memorandum of understanding signed by Trump and Pezeshkian in June.

Some commentators also argued that Rezaei's appointment might overshadow the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in negotiations with Washington. The Ministry rejected such assumptions as unfounded.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghai stated on Monday that Iran is a 'country of institutions, not individuals,' describing this institutional structure as the reason for the Islamic Republic's resilience and its ability to withstand complex circumstances. He emphasized that policy development and decision-making occur through a network of state institutions, and major national decisions, including those concerning negotiations, are made through these institutions.

Congratulating Rezaei on his appointment as SNSC secretary, Baghai noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will, as before, make every effort in full coordination with the supreme security body to protect and advance Iran's national interests. This statement is significant because it frames Rezaei's appointment within an institutional context, rather than presenting it as a transfer of authority from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a military figure.

Indeed, much of the divisive narrative surrounding Rezaei's appointment stems from his experience as a veteran military commander. But focusing solely on his military record overlooks the fact that Rezaei held high positions in Iran's political and strategic decision-making for decades.

Rezaei was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) by Imam Khomeini in 1981, at the age of 27. He held this position until 1997, becoming the longest-serving IRGC commander. His tenure coincided with some of the most intense years of the eight-year war imposed on Iraq in the 1980s, during which he was deeply involved in military strategy and decision-making during the war.

His career did not end with his departure from military command. In 1997, Rezaei was appointed secretary of the Council of Urgency by Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Martyr Leader of the Islamic Revolution. He held this position for over two decades, being deeply involved in long-term economic and strategic planning. During these years, he contributed to discussions and the development of policies concerning Iran's 20-year national vision, foreign investment policy, and the implementation of Article 44 of the Constitution. This article describes Iran's economic structure, dividing the economy into three sectors: state, cooperative, and private. It also defines the constitutional basis for the role of each sector in the national economy.

In August 2021, then-President Ebrahim Raisi appointed Rezaei as Vice President for Economic Affairs. He also served as secretary of the Supreme Council for Economic Coordination and secretary of the government's Economic Headquarters. Thus, his career path crosses traditional categories often used by foreign analysts to describe Iran's political establishment.

Rezaei is not merely a former military commander entering the political institution. He is a figure whose career has spanned from military command to strategic planning, economic management, and the highest levels of the Islamic Republic's political establishment. This breadth of experience may ultimately be the most crucial aspect of his appointment.

As SNSC secretary, Rezaei returns to one of Iran's most sensitive strategic posts, possessing decades of experience covering revolutionary struggle, military command, military strategy, strategic planning, economic policy, and high-level political decision-making. His appointment may help synchronize various dimensions of Iran's national power at a particularly sensitive time.

While Iran simultaneously grapples with military threats, economic pressure, diplomatic negotiations, and disputes over the implementation of international agreements, the ability to coordinate military, political, economic, and diplomatic institutions is becoming increasingly vital. Rezaei's experience provides him with knowledge in all these areas. His presence in the SNSC can strengthen coordination between security forces, the presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other institutions involved in national decision-making. It can also lend greater strategic weight to Iran's negotiating position, ensuring close alignment between diplomatic initiatives and the country's broader security calculations.

No less important is that Rezaei's appointment may help bridge various political currents within the country. His long career has placed him beyond the boundaries of a single institution or political faction. He has served under different administrations and worked in both military and civilian structures. His appointment does not signify the victory of one faction over another. Rather, it indicates that Iran's leadership seeks to unify various sources of national power into a more cohesive strategic structure.

Thus, the central question is not whether Rezaei represents the military establishment or Pezeshkian represents diplomacy. The more important question is how Iran combines military deterrence, political unity, and diplomacy to achieve its national interests. Rezaei has demonstrated throughout his career an understanding of the demands of both confrontation and negotiation. His experience in the Iran-Iraq War taught him the importance of military readiness and deterrence, while decades in political and economic institutions acquainted him with the complexities of public administration, policy development, and long-term national planning. For those who view every appointment through the familiar lens of 'moderates versus hardliners,' the reality may be more institutional.

The Acting Minister of Science, Research and Technology of Iran, Masoud Shams-Bakhsh, held separate meetings with representatives from Indonesia and South Africa to explore opportunities for developing scientific and technological interaction.

The meetings took place on the sidelines of the 13th BRICS Ministers of Education meeting, which was held from August 5 to 7 in Odisha, India. During negotiations with the Indonesian Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Brian Yuliarto, the parties discussed ways to develop joint scientific projects, especially in the field of new technologies.

Yuliarto spoke about Indonesia's scientific potential, particularly in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and expressed Jakarta's readiness to implement joint research programs, faculty and postgraduate exchange, provision of research leave, and organization of short-term courses jointly with Tehran. The Indonesian official invited the Minister of Science, Research and Technology, Hossein Simai-Sarraf, and Shams-Bakhsh to visit Indonesia.

For his part, Shams-Bakhsh emphasized that the long-standing cultural, historical, and religious ties between the two countries create a solid foundation for expanding educational and research cooperation. The main areas of discussion included increasing the number of scholarships, expanding scholarship exchange programs, developing joint educational courses, conducting research on climate change, food security, renewable energy, and agriculture. The parties also considered the possibility of including more Iranian universities in the BRICS University Network, based on Indonesia's experience, and noted the need to sign a memorandum of understanding for the prompt implementation of the agreements reached.

On July 15, the National Iranian Science Foundation (INSF) and the Indonesian National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) held a joint webinar titled 'Developing Scientific Research Cooperation between Iran and Indonesia: Strategic Opportunities Ahead.' The event featured presentations by INSF President Mortezah Hormozinejad and Deputy Chairman for Research and Innovation Promotion Agus Haryono. Experts and professors from both countries also gave lectures on health, water security, and environmental sectors. The event promoted scientific ties and the development of joint projects between Iran and Indonesia.

In December 2025, the Indonesian Ambassador to Tehran, Rolliansya Soemirat, stated that the new Indonesian government intends to develop scientific and technological ties with Iran, noting Iran's extensive capabilities in science and technology. According to Soemirat, the administration expects to expand international cooperation, especially in science and technology, which opens up new opportunities for interaction focused on technology exchange and new developments, as well as strengthening technological partnership. He made these remarks during a meeting with Hossein Rouzbakhsh, head of the Organization for the Development of International Cooperation in Science and Technology. Mentioning his visit to the Iranian House of Innovation and Technology (iHiT) exhibition, the ambassador noted that the exhibition only demonstrates a part of Iran's potential in science and technology, confirming Iran's status in the global science and innovation ecosystem. He also stressed that Iran (over 90 million people) and Indonesia (about 280 million people) represent a large market for technological products and services, which is an important factor for advancing bilateral relations. Soemirat highly praised the opening of the iHiT branch in Jakarta, stating that the center could become the basis for future partnerships in the technological field.

Meeting with the South African Delegation

Shams-Bakhsh also met with Nomusa Dube-Nkube, Deputy Minister of Higher Education and Training in South Africa. The parties emphasized the need to activate scientific and technological ties and discussed ways to improve cooperation in various research and educational fields. Dube-Nkube outlined South Africa's potential and interests in education, expressing the country's readiness to strengthen ties with Iran in joint research, faculty and postgraduate exchange, provision of research leave, and organizing short-term educational courses. Shams-Bakhsh, in turn, discussed opportunities for Iran's participation in initiatives led by South Africa, including the G20 Education Working Group and cooperation in recognizing academic qualifications. Both sides expressed interest in developing cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as mining, metallurgy, and renewable energy, and committed to developing a joint cooperation agreement in the near future.

The 13th BRICS Ministers of Education meeting gathered ministers of education, high-ranking officials, and delegates from all 10 BRICS member countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates—to deepen cooperation within the BRICS education track. The meeting concluded with the adoption of the BRICS Ministers of Education Declaration, which affirmed education as a key pillar of BRICS cooperation and outlined a general action plan across five priority areas under India's chairmanship in 2026. These five areas include strengthening early childhood and basic literacy, enhancing cooperation in skills development and vocational education, improving research, innovation, and startup ecosystems, promoting mutual recognition of qualifications, and building capacity for academic leadership and institutional development.

BRICS as a platform for expanding research cooperation. One of the main areas of BRICS activity in 2025 was the development of joint research projects among member states in fields such as artificial intelligence, healthcare, clean energy, food security, quantum technologies, data science, and advanced materials. Iran's membership in this network provides significant opportunities for scientists and researchers to participate in international projects. In 2025, BRICS countries discussed creating data infrastructure, exchanging supercomputing capabilities, forming joint scientific networks, and using new technologies to solve global problems. Iran, possessing capabilities in AI, data processing, and knowledge-based companies, aims to gain a larger share in future BRICS technological projects. The BRICS Action Plan for Innovation 2025–2030 is a document defining the roadmap for cooperation among member states in the digital economy, technology transfer, support for knowledge-based companies, and the development of an innovation ecosystem. Iran's participation in this plan can open the way for the exchange of technical knowledge, improvement of industrial cooperation, and entry of Iranian knowledge-based companies into new markets. The report also indicates that human capital and innovation are among BRICS' main priorities; key events in this area include the Xth Young Scientists Forum, the VIII BRICS Young Innovator Award, and the first BRICS Startup Forum. Iran's membership in BRICS can bring numerous benefits, such as broader access to international scientific and research networks, participation in joint projects, increased technological and industrial cooperation, utilization of the technology transfer network potential, development of the knowledge-based company market, and attracting investment in technology and innovation sectors. The report highlights AI, biotechnology, nanotechnology, quantum technologies, the digital economy, and space technologies as the most important axes of future cooperation between Iran and BRICS countries. It also calls for promoting scientific links between universities, research centers, knowledge-based companies, the private sector, and executive bodies to create a national coordination mechanism that strengthens cooperation with BRICS countries.

In Tehran, Azize Alishvandi, Deputy Director of the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) for International and Humanitarian Law, during a meeting with the new President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Stefan Bonami, stressed the necessity of strengthening cooperation toward a long-term strategic partnership and proposed developing a joint action plan.

Alishvandi also called for increased support for aid workers, expanded technological interaction, and the utilization of IRCS's extensive capabilities in responding to regional and international crises.

Highlighting IRCS's potential, including its wide network of search and rescue operations, land and air fleets, medical and rehabilitation centers, halal houses (crescents), vast volunteer network, production capacities, and training opportunities, she stated that IRCS is one of the most capable national societies in the region and is ready to share its experience and resources with other national societies.

Referring to over 200 rehabilitation, pharmaceutical, and medical facilities affiliated with and operating in Iran by IRCS, as well as IRCS's production capabilities for manufacturing medicines, medical equipment, and essential supplies, Alishvandi suggested expanding cooperation in technology transfer, product standardization, and utilizing IRCS's production capacities in supply chains and international humanitarian operations.

She also expressed IRCS's readiness to act as a regional center in areas such as rehabilitation, training in international humanitarian law, training on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) risk, crisis management, Restoring Family Links (RFL), and crowd management.

The representative emphasized the importance of using modern technologies, noting that the application of artificial intelligence in crisis management, hazard analysis, satellite image analysis, humanitarian data management, operational information systems, and digital crisis management can significantly improve the quality and speed of incident response.

Furthermore, Alishvandi advocated for implementing joint projects in mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), training specialized personnel, developing post-crisis intervention protocols, and cooperating during regional crises.

Speaking about developing regional cooperation in terms of preparedness and crisis response, Alishvandi noted that creating joint emergency response scenarios, conducting joint drills, pre-positioning essential supplies, and enhancing regional coordination can increase the readiness of the international movement for future crises.

She also strongly urged the ICRC to play a more constructive role in protecting civilians and rescuers during conflicts. 'Support for aid workers must become a key pillar of joint efforts. Joint protection programs, specialized mission safety training, documentation of attacks on aid personnel, and exchange of international experience should be included in the agenda,' she stated.

For his part, Bonami emphasized the need to maintain and develop the current cooperation between the two organizations, highly valuing IRCS's capabilities and valuable experience in aid operations, pre-hospital care, rehabilitation, international humanitarian law, and humanitarian crisis response. He announced ICRC's readiness to expand technical and specialized cooperation between the parties.

Expressing sympathy for the Iranians, he noted: 'We are aware of the difficult conditions the people have faced after the war.' The ICRC will strive, within its humanitarian mandate, to cooperate effectively with IRCS to alleviate human suffering.

Offering condolences regarding the loss of aid workers, he expressed sympathy to their families and the Iranian people, emphasizing: 'The loss of aid workers while carrying out humanitarian missions causes us deep concern. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are members of one family. In such circumstances, they must stick together and support each other.'

Addressing ICRC's future plans, Bonami stated that cooperation with IRCS is a cornerstone of the committee's work in the country, adding that increasing preparedness for potential crises requires close interaction, constant coordination, and joint planning.

ICRC is ready to expand cooperation with IRCS in areas such as search and rescue, pre-hospital services, psychosocial support, rehabilitation, promoting mental health for aid workers and disaster victims, and specialized training.

Mentioning the economic and livelihood consequences of US attacks on residents of southern regions of the country, especially fishermen, he expressed ICRC's willingness to support aid programs aimed at restoring the livelihoods of those affected.