South Africa is accustomed to the existence of coalition governments, and this fact is no longer disputed. The question is not whether coalitions will last forever, but whether Parliament is responding to this new political reality in a way that will strengthen or weaken democracy.
The discussion is complicated by an unusual legislative situation. The Bill on Local Government: the second amendment to municipal structures (B9-2025) is the latest version of the document officially presented to Parliament and, therefore, the only text available for public analysis. Simultaneously, it is reported that the Cabinet has approved a revised government version of this legislation, which has not yet been presented to Parliament.
This uncertainty is causing concern. Proper electoral law depends not only on the content of the rules but also on their certainty. Political parties, election administrators, and voters must know the legal framework that will govern the elections in advance. Instead, South Africa is approaching the 2026 local elections while the final legislative framework remains unclear.
Proposed Bill Provisions and Their Controversy
Regarding coalition governments, the bill currently before Parliament contains two main proposals. The first is considered reasonable: it extends several procedural deadlines from 14 to 30 days, giving political parties more time to agree on coalition agreements before forming councils. Few object to providing additional time to establish stable governing structures.
However, the second proposal has caused significantly more controversy. It provides for a ban on the participation of parties that have not received a full quota mandate in the process of distributing the remainder of votes, thereby introducing a kind of electoral threshold into the municipal electoral system. It is not yet known whether this proposal will be part of the finally adopted legislation. If it is retained, Parliament will need to consider it with extreme caution.
South Africa's municipal electoral system is based on proportional representation. Under the existing system, parties that do not receive a full quota of votes can still gain representation through the largest remainder method. This is not a loophole; it is one of the mechanisms that proportional representation uses to minimize wasted votes.
If Parliament ultimately decides to exclude these parties from the remainder distribution, serious constitutional questions will inevitably arise. The Institute for Inclusive Society has already received an independent legal opinion indicating that such a proposal raises important issues concerning proportional representation, political rights, equality, and rationality. These concerns deserve careful parliamentary consideration before any final decision is made.
The Issue of Stability and Political Culture
Even if Parliament ultimately deems such a proposal constitutionally permissible, there remains a separate political question. The underlying assumption is that reducing the number of parties represented in municipal councils will necessarily lead to more stable coalition governments. This assumption is politically appealing, but evidence to support it is far from convincing.
Coalition instability does not depend simply on the number of parties at the negotiating table. More often, it is determined by political maturity, discipline, and integrity. Germany serves as a useful reminder. One of the world's most respected parliamentary democracies recently experienced the collapse of a coalition consisting of only three parties. Conversely, many jurisdictions have maintained broad multi-party coalitions for years because coalition agreements are honored, and politicians prioritize governance over short-term political gain.
Thus, the current issue is not arithmetic, but political culture. Changing the electoral formula itself cannot create trust between coalition partners. If Parliament ultimately decides to take measures aimed at reducing political fragmentation, it must do so based on compelling empirical data, not just assumptions.
Regardless of whether this proposal survives the legislative process, a larger institutional problem remains.
Civil society organizations have repeatedly warned that electoral reforms should be completed long before elections are called. Electoral legislation should never be rewritten during an election process. Political parties need certainty. The Electoral Commission requires sufficient time to prepare. Most importantly, voters deserve assurance that the rules governing the elections have been properly debated, publicly reviewed, and constitutionally vetted before the campaign begins. These warnings seem to have been ignored once again.
This week, the Minister of Cooperation and Traditional Affairs is expected to announce the local elections for November 4, 2026, thereby launching the legally established election schedule. However, Parliament has not finished its work on legislation that directly affects the municipal electoral structure. Worse still, the public does not even know which version of the legislation Parliament will ultimately debate. The only bill available for public analysis is B9-2025, while the cabinet-approved version has not yet reached Parliament.
This is not how legislative activity functions in a constitutional democracy. The problem goes beyond one specific point or one specific bill. It concerns the democratic process itself. The legitimacy of electoral rules stems not merely from the fact that Parliament adopts them, but from them undergoing substantive public participation, thorough parliamentary scrutiny, and, where necessary, constitutional review before they begin governing elections.
As the election schedule advances, pressure mounts to conclude the legislative process quickly. This creates precisely the conditions under which substantive public participation shrinks, parliamentary oversight is limited, and constitutional issues receive less attention than they deserve.
South Africa has gone through this before. Repeated, preventable legislative delays have led to last-minute court battles over electoral legislation. Each such case creates unnecessary pressure on the Electoral Commission, political parties, and ultimately, on trust in the electoral process itself. Parliament must avoid repeating this mistake.
Whether Parliament adopts B9-2025, the cabinet's version, or a combination of both, the constitutional principles remain the same. Electoral legislation must be evidence-based, constitutionally sound, and passed with sufficient time for implementation. It cannot be rushed simply because the election calendar outpaces the legislative timeline.
Coalition governments will almost certainly be part of South Africa's political future. Therefore, Parliament has the opportunity not just to amend legislation, but to strengthen trust in the democratic process itself. This requires more than just passing another bill. It requires demonstrating that fundamental electoral rules are settled before elections begin, not after them. The race has already started. Parliament must not still be writing the rules.
