The Supreme Court refused to intervene in the order of the Calcutta High Court, which rejected the Trinamool Congress's request for assistance. This decision concerned the permission for TMC to manage three bank accounts that were frozen by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Agency.
The Supreme Court has given the Central Government two weeks to prepare a response to petitions challenging changes to the Right to Information (RTI Act) that were introduced through the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDP Act).
Plaintiffs argue that these changes reduce transparency by removing the public interest safeguard that previously governed the disclosure of personal information.
The bench, comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and judges Joymalya Bagchi and Vi Mohana, stated that it will review the Central Government's response before proceeding further. The Chief Justice noted the necessity of studying the submitted response after General Counsel Tushar Mehta requested two weeks to submit the official government reply.
During the hearings, advocate Vrinda Grover pointed out that the challenge concerns an amendment to Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which relates to exemptions from disclosing personal information. She argued that the previous provision excluded only limited categories of personal data and included a public interest test, whereas the amended provision exempts all personal data from disclosure, thereby restricting access to information protected under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
Recalling the previous session, the bench emphasized that when determining the categories of digital personal data deserving protection, a balance must be struck between the right to privacy and the right to information.
Presenting one of the plaintiffs, senior advocate Nisha Bhambani stated that the amendment could negatively affect journalistic investigations if access to information depends on the consent of the data subject or if people can subsequently demand the deletion of information related to public accountability.
Advocate Prashant Bhushan argued that the constitutional balance between the right to information and the right to privacy was already established by the Supreme Court in the case of Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal. He cited judgments written by judges D. Y. Chandrachud and N. V. Ramana, noting that the Court recognized both rights as fundamental and held that the RTI Act already provided due balance.
Bhushan insisted that the original Section 8(1)(j) exempted only personal information not related to any public activity or public interest, or whose disclosure constituted an unjustified intrusion into privacy. In his view, the amended provision eliminates this distinction by treating all personal information as exempt from disclosure.
He also contended that the amendment could hinder the disclosure of data such as unfinished indictments against public servants or records concerning social welfare programs and national cards, simply because such information might be classified as personal.
The matter will be considered after the Central Government submits its response.
The Supreme Court (SC) commented on Punjab's unwillingness to comply with a resolution made 15 years ago concerning the payment of electricity debts owed by Himachal Pradesh. The Court noted that the state has a tendency to disregard judicial decisions, stating: 'The state has a habit of challenging rulings, and old habits are difficult to change.'
Attorney General R. Venkataramani informed the bench, including Chief Justice Surya Kant, that after reviewing materials from the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), he conducted extensive consultations with Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and the Union Ministry of Power to independently determine historical liability for capital expenditure.
The AG stated that a mutually acceptable settlement plan has been developed. It involves a cashless transaction where mutual claims and obligations will be offset through the netting of energy dues and the repayment of capital expenditure liability, thereby eliminating the need for direct financial transactions between the states.
Senior advocates Kapil Sibal (representing Himachal) and Balbir Singh (representing Haryana) agreed with the AG's proposed plan for implementing the resolution adopted by the Supreme Court in 2011 based on an original suit filed by Himachal 30 years ago demanding asset settlement during the partition of Punjab in 1966.
However, senior advocate Nidesh Gupta, representing Punjab, expressed concerns about the feasibility of the AG's proposal, noting that the state could incur significant losses. Considering this is a 15-year-old resolution stemming from a 30-year-old original suit aimed at resolving a 60-year inter-state dispute, the court reiterated its warning about the state's habit of ignoring decisions.
The Court emphasized: 'There is a ruling in favor of Himachal. When we order its execution, it will be with interest from 2011. We will not allow them to lose the fruits of this ruling. If you agree to the settlement, that is good. Otherwise, be prepared for the consequences.' The matter was scheduled for hearing on August 12.
In its judgment dated July 30, the court pointed out that while the states of Himachal and Haryana had kindly agreed in principle to the proposal, Punjab had raised objections. In the interest of justice, Punjab was given two weeks to reconsider its position and clarify it.
The AG's proposal suggested that Punjab and Haryana would provide 13,066 MU of energy dues to Himachal Pradesh at a rate of 871 MU per year over 15 low season periods (October-March), in a ratio of 58:42 (Bhakra-Nangal project) and 60:40 (Bias projects). Himachal Pradesh would pay bills determined by BBMB for the year of receiving each tranche.
Furthermore, Himachal Pradesh's liability (7.19% of total Punjab) for the capital expenditure of the Bhakra-Nangal and Bias projects—which represents the unreimbursed portion of loan servicing by Punjab and Haryana from 1966 to 1967—should be assessed at ₹420.7 crore (Punjab: ₹249.2 crore; Haryana: ₹171.5 crore). This capital expenditure liability can be accounted for when offsetting part of Himachal Pradesh's energy receivables.
At a rate of ₹3.85 per unit, the volume of units subject to offset amounts to approximately 1093 MU. Previously, on September 27, 2011, the Supreme Court (judges R. V. Ravindran and A. K. Patnaik) ruled in favor of Himachal Pradesh, establishing that the state is entitled to 7.19% of the total power from Punjab's Bhakra-Nangal project from November 1, 1966, and from the Bias project from the date of production in Blocks I and II.
The Supreme Court has limited the powers of the National Commission on Castes (NCSC), establishing that this commission is an advisory body providing recommendations and advice, not an entity with the authority to make judicial decisions.
The bench, comprising Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih, stated that the commission has the right to forward its recommendations either to the federal center or the state for the execution of its functions. However, the court clarified that a resolution adopted by the NCSC is not mandatory for implementation in matters concerning service.
The court emphasized that the powers vested in the NCSC are limited in nature. It was noted that the NCSC and other similar bodies are constitutional structures established under Articles 338A and 338B with a noble social objective; however, the legislature defined their role as advisory and consultative, not judicial. These bodies are not intended to replace the functions of judicial organs.
The court also clarified the provision stating that the commission is authorized to 'inquire into specific complaints regarding deprivation of rights and safeguards of Caste people.' The bench ruled that despite having the power to demand documents and accept evidence, the commission does not have the right to pass a verdict based on this evidence. In simpler terms, the NCSC can record factual findings and then require the relevant government—either Central or State—to take appropriate measures.
The court rejected the NCSC's argument that the word 'safeguards,' mentioned in the relevant provision, implies compulsory enforcement. The court observed that such an argument is difficult to accept given the explicit wording of the Article. It concluded that this provision does not grant the commission judicial authority, but at best, advisory authority. Thus, the commission cannot act as a court or judicial tribunal to determine the rights of parties, the court added.
The court's judgment may also apply to other constitutional and statutory bodies established to ensure the interests of various population groups, including women, minorities, and backward classes.
