Due to the entry of several Chinese brands into the Brazilian market over the last three years, offering highly competitive prices and achieving good sales, many automakers were forced to reduce the values of their already available cars to maintain high sales volume.
One of the most recent cuts was implemented by Nissan on its new generation Kicks, which received reductions of up to ten thousand reais. The price range between one hundred and twenty thousand and two hundred thousand reais was the most impacted by Chinese competition, as these brands already offer electric and hybrid models in these price brackets.
Some manufacturers, such as those belonging to the Stellantis group and Volkswagen, showed greater resistance in lowering official prices, opting instead to apply promotional discounts at dealerships, which can reach almost thirty thousand reais.
Below, we detail which vehicles had price list reductions, excluding dealership discounts, as these can depend on variables such as the type of sale or the delivery of a used vehicle.
The new version of the Nissan Kicks was launched with prices reaching two hundred thousand reais, making it the most expensive 1.0 turbo car in the market. However, with the introduction of the 2027 line, the Japanese manufacturer promoted a decrease in values. Currently, the different versions present increases of ten thousand reais, with the top-of-the-line Platinum version adjusted to R$ 189,990, without any change in its content.
Jeep was cited as one of the brands most sensitive to Chinese pressure, as both the Renegade and the Compass registered a drop in sales in recent years. In 2026, both received price reductions to remain competitive, even though they have been on the market for more than a decade.
The Renegade's entry-level version, the Sport, was discontinued to make way for the new Avenger. The Altitude model was launched in the 2027 line for R$ 149,990, but later had its promotional price of R$ 129,990 established as the catalog value in subsequent months.
The Compass Sport is sold for R$ 147,990, aiming to compete with Chinese mid-size SUVs operating in this price range. Regarding the national line, only the Commander did not suffer a catalog reduction, relying solely on discounts offered at dealerships.
Concerning the Suzuki Jimny, due to its inability to comply with new emission regulations in Brazil, HPE Automotores began importing the electric SUV and the Vitara to maintain the brand's presence in the country. Its initial price was R$ 269,990, but it was quickly reduced to R$ 219,990.
Mitsubishi applied reductions across its entire product range, with discounts reaching fifty-five thousand reais. The Eclipse Cross, for example, had its price reduced from R$ 176,990 to R$ 159,990 in the entry-level version.
The most benefited model was the Outlander PHEV, which saw its price drop from R$ 379,990 to R$ 324,990 in the HPE-S version, making it more competitive against Chinese competitors. The Triton now has an initial price starting from R$ 249,990.
Chevrolet opted to introduce a compact Chinese electric SUV to compete directly with the BYD Dolphin and other Chinese hatchbacks. However, the brand maintained a high price, requesting over R$ 170 thousand for the model.
Currently, the Spark EUV has a cataloged price of R$ 144,990, a more competitive value in the current scenario. This vehicle is assembled under the SKD regime at the Pace factory located in Ceará, which helps contain costs.
The 2027 line of the Volkswagen Taos was launched with an aesthetic redesign and the inclusion of new equipment. Simultaneously, its price list was reduced by twenty thousand reais, causing the model to now start at R$ 199,990.
Finally, the Kia Sorento returned to the Brazilian market with a diesel engine and a proposal similar to that of the Jeep Commander. Just six months after its launch, its price was decreased by fifty-five thousand reais, costing R$ 344,990.
Lumilens Inc., known for developing optical networking chips for artificial intelligence clusters, recently raised $900 million to expand its operations. The majority of the funds came from a Series C round of $700 million, which valued the two-year-old company at $5.51 billion.
Atreides Management, Bain Capital Ventures, Meritech, Seligman Ventures, and Spark Capital participated in this round, leading the financing. Qualcomm and over a dozen other investors also participated in the investment. The company is led by co-founder and CEO Ankur Singhal.
Historically, data centers have used copper wires to transmit data between processors. This method allows for lower speeds, but AI clusters exceed these limitations. Copper can only transmit data at a speed of about 1.6 terabits per second over a distance of approximately one meter, which limits operation within a single rack cabinet.
Lumilens' chips replace copper connections with fiber optic cables. Fiber optics allow for the transmission of more data over longer distances with less energy consumption, which is critical for companies building clusters of thousands of graphics processing units (GPUs).
Lumilens focuses on network scaling through two product lines. The first is Co-Packaged Optics (CPO), which integrates optics directly into the GPU. Due to its proximity to the processor, data travels a shorter distance, increasing energy efficiency. The company claims that CPO can connect thousands of GPUs.
The second line is Near-Packaged Optics (NPO), where optics are located near the GPU on the motherboard but not inside it. Although NPO is less efficient than CPO, it is easier to implement currently.
Singhal believes that it will take another two to three years for the large-scale volume deployment of Co-Packaged Optics. Lumilens first tested its chip in 2024, and the second next-generation chip is under testing and planned for commercial launch next year.
For network scaling, Lumilens produces chips for pluggable transceivers that attach to switches and connect entire rows of GPUs. This technology supports speeds of up to 800 gigabits per second, 1.6 terabits per second, and higher. Since optics are used, there are no distance limitations that make copper impractical outside of a rack cabinet. Singhal emphasized that companies need to transition to optical solutions to go beyond the rack cabinet.
All Lumilens chips are built on LumiCore—a common set of building blocks. It includes photonic components, mixed-signal integrated circuits (mixed-signal ICs), and interposers that serve as the base layer for optical and electronic elements. The company states that LumiCore reduces development time from several years to several months, and the interposer design simplifies assembly.
Lumilens has developed its own manufacturing process using robots and AI-based software to support scaling. The $900 million will be directed towards accelerating chip development and production. In the race among AI labs to create larger clusters, Lumilens is betting that optical communication will become the foundation of next-generation AI infrastructure.
Titan Company Ltd, a leading manufacturer of jewelry and watches, reported on Friday a rise in consolidated net profit by 62.87 percent, reaching 1,777 crore rupees for the June quarter of fiscal year 27. This growth was driven by the jewelry business.
According to regulatory filings, in the corresponding period from April to June last year, the company earned a net profit of 1,091 crore rupees.
For the June quarter of fiscal year 27, the company's sales grew by 40.31 percent year-on-year, amounting to 20,787 crore rupees, compared to 14,814 crore rupees in the same quarter last year.
Titan's total expenses for the June quarter increased by 26 percent year-over-year, reaching 19,075 crore rupees.
The company's jewelry business, which accounts for about 90 percent of the entire business, showed a growth of 29.73 percent, reaching 19,002 crore rupees in the first quarter of fiscal year 27, compared to 14,647 crore rupees in the corresponding quarter of the previous fiscal year.
Titan's total consolidated revenue for the reporting quarter increased by 29.3 percent, totaling 21,502 crore rupees.
On Friday, shares of Titan Company Ltd closed at 4,943 rupees per share, declining by 0.82 percent on the BSE exchange.
India has achieved a unique success among industrializing nations by preserving traditional weaving methods that have disappeared or declined in other textile economies. More than 120 years after the start of the Swadeshi Movement, which placed the loom at the center of economic self-sufficiency, millions of Indian families continue to use these techniques.
The Union Minister for Textiles, Giriraj Singh, informed Rajya Sabha in March 2026 that about 95% of the world's handloom products are produced in India, with approximately 35.22 lakh weavers and associated workers, and over 28 lakh looms in the country. This is a reason to celebrate on National Handloom Day.
However, mere survival does not equate to prosperity, as the workforce is shrinking. According to the Third Handloom Census, 43.32 lakh workers were registered in 2010–2011, while the Fourth Census showed a decline to 35.2 lakh between 2019–20. India has preserved the skill, but it has not yet created the economic base that can support the people.
Although a handwoven Kanjeevaram saree can sell for ₹30,000 or more, a study of handloom enterprises and crafts in five states, published in May 2026 by the Institute of Human Development and the Crafts Council of India, established an average added value of approximately ₹7,000 per worker per month, or about ₹270 per day. These two figures cannot be directly compared because the retail price of a saree includes silk, zari, dyeing, pre-weaving preparation, design, working capital, inventory storage, and retail overheads, which are distributed among numerous participants. The figure of ₹7,000 is an average for one worker across two sectors and five states, not net wages for a specific item.
Nevertheless, this contrast points to a real problem: value accumulates as the fabric moves toward the exhibition hall, while the economic situation of the person at the loom remains unchanged. The macroeconomic picture reflects the micro-level: in the fiscal year 2025–26, India exported handloom products worth ₹1,359 crore out of a total of textiles, apparel, and crafts worth ₹3.25 lakh crore, accounting for only about 0.42%. For a country that produces a large portion of the world's woven cloth, this is a very small share of its own textile revenue.
The handloom census data contains a metric that better explains weavers' earnings than any arguments about wage rates, and this metric is rarely cited. The Fourth Census records an average weaving activity of 208 days per year per person: 262 days in urban areas and 201 days in rural areas. This is an improvement compared to the 183 working days recorded in the Third Census. However, even with 201 days in villages where 88.7% of weaver households reside, the rural weaver still stands idle for about two out of five days. This changes the focus of the problem: low income is largely an issue of order flow, not just insufficient payment per unit, and the order flow depends on design institutions, export channels, and market linkages.
Any intervention in the handloom sector must be evaluated on three criteria: does it increase the number of paid days at the loom, does it increase the share of value reaching the artisan, and does it make this income more predictable. Women constitute 72.29% of India's handloom workforce, or over 25 lakh workers. Nevertheless, in July 2025, the Ministry of Textiles stated that it had not conducted a special study on the income and working conditions of female weavers, which is a serious oversight. Since women dominate the workforce, policy in this area must track their earnings, paid days, and the effectiveness of improving their income through finance, technology, and market access.
Women's income cannot be considered merely an indirect result; it must become a key indicator. It is easy to blame intermediaries for the gap between the retail price and the weaver's income, but reality is more complex. Master weavers, contractors, and traders finance yarn procurement, disseminate designs, control quality, and assume market risks. Eliminating them without replacing these functions will lead to a deterioration of the weaver household's condition, not an improvement.
The core problem lies in the imbalance of information and bargaining power. The artisan possesses production knowledge and technical skill, while the intermediary controls customer relationships, order flows, wholesale prices, and design trends. Limited only to production, weavers lack pricing leverage and everything the fabric brings in subsequent stages. Financial isolation exacerbates the situation: less than a quarter of the 26.73 lakh weavers counted in the census had bank accounts, and only about 4% were insured. A household without a bank account cannot easily receive payment from a remote buyer, cannot build a credit history, and has few alternatives for those who pay cash at the door. The solution is not to eliminate intermediaries, but to create institutions that provide weavers with visibility, bargaining power, and a share of the final profit.
Since mechanical looms always produce fabric faster and cheaper, the economic question for handloom boils down to whether buyers can reliably distinguish authentic handloom products from cheaper alternatives, and whether the premium they pay for authenticity reaches the loom itself. India has attempted to solve this problem twice through certification. The Handloom Mark, introduced in 2006, certified authenticity, and the India Handloom Brand, launched on the first National Handloom Day in 2015 for zero-defect and eco-friendly products, ensured quality control. By August 2024, 1,998 registrations had been issued across 184 product categories—a significant achievement in standardization, as well as about 220 registrations per year in a sector with 35 lakh workers.
The conclusion is not that branding was the wrong tool, but that the mark itself does not generate orders. Certification tells the buyer that the fabric is genuine, but it does not bring the buyer to the fabric. Therefore, certification should be evaluated not only by the number of registrations issued but also by whether it creates buyer trust, higher realized prices, and repeat orders for certified producers.
Market programs have significantly expanded geographical reach, and the state has also created its own channel: the Commissioner for Development (Handloom) manages the India Handmade portal, intended for weavers to sell without intermediaries, alongside listings of weavers on the State e-Marketplace. However, reach cannot be confused with income. On any platform, the default seller is usually not an individual weaver, but a cooperative, brand, master weaver, or aggregator. Sales growth of an account demonstrates channel efficiency, not an increase in the per-unit rate at the loom, and platform metrics rarely disclose net payouts after commissions, logistics, returns, and aggregator margins. The solution applies equally to private and public platforms: there must be an annual assessment of the artisans' economy published, showing how many weavers were paid, how much money they received, how fast, and what the per-unit price was.
India has schemes to support handloom, and it is no longer accurate to claim that government reporting only accounts for investments. In the materials for this year's National Handloom Day, the Ministry of Textiles published something more useful than counting deployed looms: data on how these interventions affected earnings. Moving a household from ₹9,600 to ₹15,000 per month allows it to overcome the threshold that holds back most of the sector; according to the latest census, 66.3% of weaver households earned less than ₹5,000 per month. Interventions are working, and the government can now demonstrate this.
The gap is in coverage. Between 2021–22 and June 2026, over 40,000 Weaver MUDRA loans worth over ₹280 crore, averaging about ₹70,000, were approved, covering approximately 1.1% of the census workforce. In 2025–26, ₹94 crore was allocated for workshops, looms, accessories, and electronic jacquards. During the same period, 357 small clusters were approved, and ₹370.72 crore reached 162,682 weavers through mega-clusters. For 2026–27, the National Handloom Development Programme provides ₹205 crore, and the Raw Material Supply Scheme provides ₹200 crore.
The situation shows that proven interventions have reached only a small fraction of those who could benefit, which is a different, more manageable problem. The question for the next cycle is not what works, but what is needed to provide electronic jacquards or proper workshops to the remaining 99%. Time is critical: the current program cycle runs until 2025–26, so anything that follows can be benchmarked against metrics that the Ministry can now show.
India has 29 Weaver Service Centers, confirmed by the Textile Minister in June 2026, as well as a network of Indian Institutes of Handloom Technology. They possess deep capabilities in CAD design, dyeing, and loom upgrading, and cluster guidelines already allocate up to ₹15 lakh for a designer-marketer within a limit of ₹2 crore per cluster. Infrastructure and budgetary lines exist; what remains invisible is any published metric of what they are producing commercially. Each center could take on specific cluster nodes and remain involved from product development to repeat orders, being evaluated by products brought to market, converted export orders, and documented change in artisan net income. This would transform existing technical institutions into accountable commercial bridges between government investment and actual order flow. The key metric is: are there more paid days on the loom?
A new institution has been created for this purpose. The Centre of Excellence in Handloom Technology was opened at IIT Delhi on August 3, 2026, with an investment of ₹11.99 crore by the Government of India, launching the Handloom 4.0 productivity application, the Handloom e-Vidya training platform, and the HandloomX sector startup accelerator. It plans to train at least 1,000 people over five years. The agenda is correct; the question is about scaling early on.
The financial problem arises even before the product reaches the buyer. A confirmed order can still leave the weaver household dependent on whoever is willing to provide funds for yarn, dyes, and wages while the product goes through production and retail. A larger opportunity for startups lies in the label, in the backend infrastructure of clusters: financing orders for procurement under confirmed brands, which reduces dependence on working capital tied to who supplies the yarn; standardized quality control to prevent substitution with mechanical looms; joint export documentation; and payment systems that pay weavers within days of delivery, not after retail settlement. Technology should not try to automate handloom; it should eliminate the economic uncertainty surrounding it. Here, formal finance can go beyond loans tied to individual recipients. If confirmed orders can become bankable assets, working capital can follow demand, rather than forcing the artisan to bear the risk before the product is sold. There is also a demand lever already enshrined in law and rarely discussed: central government agencies must procure at least 20% of their textile needs from handloom producers, including cooperatives, self-help group federations, manufacturing companies, and weavers holding Pehchan cards. This is the largest guaranteed order book available to the sector, and the question of how compliance looks agency by agency deserves consideration.
The infrastructure for a more commercially accountable handloom economy is largely ready: over 200 handloom manufacturing companies established between 2020–21 and 2026–27, 29 Weaver Service Centers, a new Centre of Excellence, a state e-commerce channel, a procurement mandate, and, for the first time, published evidence of which interventions increase weaver income. The e-Pehchan portal, launched in January 2025, creates a level of identification that will allow income measurement at the individual level, not the scheme level.
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