Forecast of 2.5% rent increase for 2027

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) cautions against panic regarding the introduction of charges for UPI transactions. Under a bill presented by the Ministry of Finance in Parliament, the introduction of Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) is being discussed, which may apply to payments exceeding the limit of 2000 rupees.

The emergence of this news has caused concern among the public, and surveys indicate a potential withdrawal of many users from the UPI system due to the new rules. However, RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra emphasized that it is premature to draw any conclusions, as the payment system is still in the discussion phase of changes.

RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra noted that one should not rush to make statements regarding the introduction of MDR for UPI transactions. He clarified that the discussion process for the payment system continues, and this system previously helped reduce the need for cash in small transactions. Malhotra stressed that the Reserve Bank's priority is the maximum adoption of UPI, and the government continues to work on amendments.

According to Sanjay Malhotra, the costs associated with the electronic payment system must ultimately be borne by someone.

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman presented a bill on taxation and other laws (amendments) in Parliament on Tuesday, which proposes to repeal restrictions preventing banks and payment service providers from charging MDR on notified electronic payments. Nevertheless, this regulation pertains exclusively to business matters, not all users.

Since this concerns trade-related transactions, ordinary users will not feel the impact of this change. Therefore, the probability that this will affect daily purchases of items such as milk, vegetables, groceries, as well as taxi and auto-rickshaw fares, is extremely low. Despite this, much misinformation is circulating on social media claiming that this rule will apply to all users.

According to some reports based on sources, this proposal specifically targets commercial operations exceeding 2000 rupees and large commercial establishments. Transactions between consumers (Consumer to Consumers) will be exempt from collection. Thus, ordinary users can make payments exceeding 2000 rupees without any charges. The standard UPI limit is 1 lakh rupees per day, and in some special categories (such as hospitals, education, taxes), this limit can be significantly higher.

The MDR fee is a charge that businesses must pay to payment service providers and banks for conducting digital transactions. It is evident that this fee will apply to traders, not to regular UPI users. Initially, this step was planned for launch in January 2020 but was suspended by the government to stimulate digital payments.

The main burden will fall on banks, UPI service providers, the payment ecosystem for traders, and sellers accepting small payments through BHIM-UPI, as incentives are provided specifically for these transactions. According to statistics, 95 percent of transactions are amounts less than 2000 rupees, while only 5 percent exceed this amount. This means that this fee will only apply to these 5 percent of trade transactions.

In Jammu and Kashmir, there is a unique kind of ambition that thrives not despite the difficulties, but because of them. These aspirations have ceased to be mere stories and are acquiring institutional character. Beneath the usual narratives about the region lies a quieter but significant story: thousands of young people prefer to create rather than wait.

Gradually, a complete ecosystem is forming around them. This story tells how the foundation was laid—the institutions, policies, capital, and culture that needed to take shape before any talk of the next step could begin.

Startup ecosystems do not emerge spontaneously; they are built gradually through the patient creation of institutions, which rarely makes it into news headlines. The central institution in these efforts is the Jammu and Kashmir Entrepreneurship Development Institute (JKEDI), which has undergone its own transformation, evolving from a training body into a full-fledged assistant to the entire ecosystem.

Its tasks cover the entire cycle of entrepreneurial activity: awareness raising, capacity building, incubation, project financing, mentorship, market access, and investor assistance. The logic is simple, though the execution is complex: entrepreneurs fail not in one spot, but everywhere support is absent. JKEDI's ambition is to eliminate these gaps.

The figures, while imperfect indicators of progress, deserve attention. Over 40,000 aspiring entrepreneurs have completed structured training. More than 235,000 participants have been reached through 4,100 awareness programs. Over 35,500 detailed project reports have been prepared, each representing a founder who received institutional funding instead of rejection from a formal system they did not know how to utilize.

Approximately over a decade, from 2010 to 2020, about 16,000 enterprises were created—businesses that provide livelihoods for families and reflect the choice of people who decided to build something of their own. These are not trivial achievements in a region where entrepreneurial infrastructure had to be built from scratch.

Political documents can easily be dismissed as intentions wrapped in actions. The Jammu and Kashmir policy on startups for 2024–27 raises questions about whether it is active or merely desired. The answer requires understanding the context, as timelines matter more than many realize.

The policy was officially notified in 2024, but operational guidelines were only released in July 2025, with implementation starting in August 2025. This means that all reported successes—growth in registrations, seed funding, mentor networks, cultural momentum—were achieved in less than a year.

This was not a year with a generous budget and a head start, but the first year carrying all the limitations inherent in the initial phase: systems were being created in real-time, and the team was mastering the operational structure of the policy even as it was being provided.

The first year's budget reflected this reality: it was modest enough to demonstrate the concept, but not large enough to approach a full-scale level. Against this backdrop, early indicators should be interpreted differently: about 1,400 startups were registered.

Twenty-five startups received approved seed funding of 20 lakh rupees each. Four incubators received grants of 50 lakh rupees each, with the first tranches already disbursed. A mentor network of over 400 specialists is ready to actively participate. Registrations are accelerating as awareness spreads beyond early adopters into the broader entrepreneurial community.

Beyond the numbers, the policy provided something equally important—connections. Startups were sponsored to attend national events, including Startup Mahakumbh and Bangalore Tech Summit, giving founders from Jammu and Kashmir direct access to investors, peers, and opportunities previously unavailable.

Regular mentorship sessions with successful founders, investors, and national mentors have become a routine part of the ecosystem, not an occasional feature. These are not the results of a mature, fully funded program operating at full capacity. They are ten months of implementation under real constraints, making them significantly more meaningful than they appear at first glance.

The policy demonstrated in this compressed period that the architecture functions. It does not just announce incentives; it paves a structured path from idea to registration, mentorship, seed support, and market access, integrating digital platforms and investor interaction into the implementation process rather than viewing them as future additions. Founders involved in this process find a system that moves, albeit imperfectly, and has the potential for improvement, yet possesses genuine operational intent.

If there is one metric that distinguishes an ecosystem from a program, it is the willingness of private investors to risk capital. Grants and government support can nurture businesses in the early stages; it is patient private capital that determines whether these businesses can scale.

This is where Jammu and Kashmir begins to answer an old question: will serious investors look beyond geographical borders? Thanks to programs like Capital Connect, over twenty-five venture funds have directly engaged with founders from the region, and this occurred not in superficial meetings, but through structured presentation sessions, investor interactions, and mentorship events.

Startups from Jammu and Kashmir, such as Fast Beetle Services, Genetico Research, GR8 Sports, and E-Curve, have attracted institutional funding amounting to several crores. These are not symbolic investments made out of regional goodwill. They are commercial decisions made by serious investors who recognized what these companies were building and chose to support them accordingly.

For every founder in Jammu and Kashmir watching from the sidelines, each such deal subtly changes the perception of what is possible.

A founder without access to prototyping equipment, co-working spaces, or peer networks operates with a structural deficit that motivation alone cannot overcome. Incubation infrastructure is not a luxury; it is the difference between an idea that develops and an idea that vanishes.

Last year, the Startup Policy funded four university incubators at IIT Jammu, SMVDU Katra, IUST Pulwama, and SKUAST Kashmir, providing each with a grant of 50 lakh rupees, with the first tranches already disbursed. The selection of institutions was deliberate: placing incubation within universities allows it to be located where early-stage founders are, instead of requiring them to travel to receive support that should come to them.

Strategic partnerships brought national expertise into this infrastructure. Collaboration with T-Hub, TISS, and leading corporations, including Tally, Zoho, AWS, and Sanchi Connect, connected our incubators to networks, best practices, and opportunities far beyond what any regional organization could build independently.

The Startup India initiative further integrated our work into the national framework, ensuring that the Jammu and Kashmir ecosystem is connected to the country's broader innovation architecture, rather than functioning on the periphery.

Infrastructure can be built. Policy can be written. Capital can be mobilized. But none of this will be sustainable without a generational shift in people's mindset regarding entrepreneurship as a viable and desirable path, and culture requires much more time to form than any program or policy.

Last year, we launched a Startup Idea Contest, not primarily as a competition, but as a catalyst. The goal was to awaken entrepreneurial thinking where it had not yet been invited: in rural areas, remote districts, communities where the idea of starting a business never seemed a realistic option. Over 5,000 students participated in 43 camps, covering all 20 districts of Jammu and Kashmir.

This is not contest statistics. It is 5,000 young people who spent time in a setting where they were told, through structure, through mentors, through peers, that their ideas deserved serious consideration. For many of them, this was the first such recognition.

The Idea Contest for those under 18 is a continuation of this logic and perhaps an initiative we are secretly proud of. It reaches students before they finalize their views on what they are capable of and what they are not. The reason is simple: if we approach people after they have already decided on their future, we are too late.

Combined with design thinking workshops, access to workshops, and structured mentorship, the Under-18 Contest is not intended to produce teenage entrepreneurs. It is designed to cultivate a generation of people who inherently start building when faced with a problem, regardless of the career path they ultimately choose.

We have also begun to systematically develop founder potential through training modules covering market validation, pricing strategy, intellectual property, regulatory pathways, and fundraising. The gap between a good idea and a funded business is rarely talent-related. More often, it is knowledge that no one has decided to transfer.

The Jammu and Kashmir startup ecosystem has reached a tipping point that must be stated plainly. The policy is working. Institutions exist. Incubation infrastructure is expanding. Private capital is beginning to flow. The cultural momentum, for the first time measurable in thousands of students attending camps across twenty districts, is real.

These are not trifles. Years of sustained effort were required to create them, and they are important. Five years ago, this conversation would have been impossible because the institutions, policy architecture, mentor networks, and early cohort of funded companies did not exist. Now they do.

This is the foundation. What will be built upon it and how fairly the next stage will be measured is another story that is still being written.

In South Africa, there are two types of pension funds, and most employees are unaware of which type they belong to. This factor determines whether the company or the employee bears the financial risk.

The first type of fund, known as a defined benefit fund, guarantees a specific amount. Its charter specifies an amount, usually a portion of your final salary for each year worked, which must be paid to you monthly for life. If investments perform poorly or pensioners live longer than expected, the fund and employer are obligated to find the missing funds, and your pension will not decrease.

The second type, a defined contribution fund, promises accumulation rather than a payment. You and your employer contribute a fixed portion of your salary to an account in your name. These funds are invested, commissions are deducted, and upon retirement, you receive the amount in the account. No one guarantees this figure; if markets fall in the last year of work, your pension falls with them.

An analogy can be drawn between a company car and a car allowance. With a company car, responsibility for breakdowns lies with the firm, whereas with an allowance, you are responsible for your own vehicle. One option is a promise, the other is simply a payment.

Previously, employers in South Africa predominantly used the first type of funds. In the 1980s and 1990s, most companies switched to the second. The old approach obligated the company to pay pensions for decades, while the new approach terminates the fund's obligations at the time of contribution. According to a study conducted from 1980 to 2006, thousands of local funds changed their system.

Guaranteed pensions today are mainly preserved in public services and some older corporate funds. Then changes occurred: previously there were thousands of small funds belonging to one employer. In 2000, there were 15,587, and by 2023, the regulator, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, counted about 4,900, only a small fraction of which is active.

Small funds closed down, and their members transferred to large 'umbrella' funds serving multiple employers. This reduces costs and improves administration, which is supported by the regulator. However, there is a problem that is rarely explained: previously, funds had their own trustees—people from your workplace, some elected by employees. In umbrella funds, they are replaced by trustees of the umbrella itself, who decide where your money goes, what commissions you pay, and what protection you receive. You do not choose them and cannot remove them. Usually, they perform well, but sometimes they may not suit you. In any case, they claim that you lose control on the day the employer registers you.

Throughout all these changes, the position of the ordinary member changed the most significantly, yet was the least discussed. Most South Africans could not say which fund they were in or what rules it promised. They find out at age 60 or 65, when they should stop working, and by then, nothing can be done.

A man worked at ZF Services South Africa from April 1995 until his retirement in October 2023. His fund was an old, guaranteed type. The fund's rules stipulated 2.5% of the final salary for the first 20 years of service and 1.5% thereafter—totaling 1,347,595.47 annually, or 112,299.62 per month.

The fund refused to pay this amount and instead provided a lump sum of 14,468,962.88, advising him to purchase monthly income from an insurer. This is called an annuity: you give the money, and the insurer pays you income for life. Sanlam estimated this amount at approximately 91,200 per month, which is about 21,000 less than what the fund's rules promised. To reach the amount of 112,300, the insurer stated that he would need about 17 million. He was short by approximately 2.53 million, and this gap would increase every year throughout his life.

The fund claimed that its calculation complied with standard industry practice and that surplus funds raised its total income to 18.3 million by September 2024. An independent actuary—a specialist who calculates pension values—agreed that this was reasonable but warned that if members could demand any promised pension, funds could run into trouble.

Nevertheless, Deputy Arbitrator of Pension Funds Nahim Essop supported the complaint. A lawyer with sixteen years of experience in the field, who defended the case in the Supreme Court regarding how fund rules should be interpreted, refused to settle the dispute arithmetically and referred to the charter itself. It stated that the pension must be of a specific amount. Nothing allowed the fund to replace this promise with an amount that could be bought with a lump-sum payment.

He ruled that in a guaranteed fund, what you receive is fixed by the rules, and if funds are insufficient, the employer must top up, not the pensioner. The fund's figure was rejected, and the fund was given 30 days to pay the actually required amount.

This decision confirms a long-standing legal position: the fund's charter is its constitution. It obligates the fund, its officials, and its members, and no manager can go beyond its framework.

Simply put: if your fund promised you a pension, it cannot give you a smaller amount and call the difference market reality. This gap is the fund's and the employer's problem, not yours. However, it is worth noting how he succeeded: he obtained an external assessment, compared it with his fund's rules, and refused to let this gap go unnoticed. Most people would simply accept the check and never know.

Before signing anything, it is recommended to check three things long before your last working day: which of the two types of funds you belong to, who your trustees are and whether they still work where you work, and exactly what your rules promise in writing, not what the benefits statement estimates.

Pension funds—pension, provident, preservation, and annuity—are regulated by overlapping laws, fund rules, and tax regulations that frequently change. It is a minefield. Before signing anything upon retirement or agreeing to a transfer, consult a qualified specialist for review and insist on reviewing the rules governing your funds.

Many avoid such a visit due to fear of cost. One must honestly weigh: an hour of a specialist's time versus an error costing 2.53 million that could haunt this person for life. One conversation often separates golden years from a life of want.