The largest registered outbreak of African Swine Fever (ASF) on commercial pig farms in South Africa has been successfully localized. Farms affected by the outbreak north of Pretoria have been depopulated, and they are expected to return to full production capacity within the next 12–18 months.
Nevertheless, the South African Pork Producers Organisation (Sappo) warned that ASF remains a constant threat, especially in small and informal pig farming systems where recurrent outbreaks pose significant financial and biosecurity risks.
Carla Zitsman, General Manager of Sappo, noted that while the commercial outbreak is contained, producers cannot afford to become complacent. In an interview with Food For Mzansi, she provided more detailed information on the state of the industry.
Zitsman specified that the ASF outbreak in commercial pig farms north of Pretoria in 2025/26 was the largest in South African history. This outbreak has been eliminated, and all affected pig complexes have been depopulated. These facilities are expected to be repopulated and reach full capacity within a period of 12 to 18 months.
However, ASF remains a persistent risk as outbreaks continue in small and informal settings. In such cases, the financial consequences of quarantine, production losses, and restocking can be difficult to absorb.
Previously, disease outbreaks caused significant uncertainty regarding local pork supply. Due to reduced production capacity and disruption of the normal market cycle, imports increased to compensate for potential shortages. Simultaneously, concerns over reduced local production led to a rise in wholesale pork prices from approximately R32/kg to around R40/kg.
Currently, as commercial farms recover and imported products enter the market, supply exceeds demand, leading to a decrease in wholesale prices back to around R30/kg. Sappo forecasts a gradual market normalization rather than sharp price fluctuations; as local production and demand balance out, prices are likely to stabilize closer to the long-term average of around R32/kg.
Consumers can be assured of the safety of pork sold through official retail channels. Neither African Swine Fever (ASF) nor Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) poses a threat to human health, as these are animal diseases not transmitted to humans through pork consumption.
South Africa operates robust meat control and food safety systems at every stage of the supply chain. Animals are inspected before slaughter, carcasses undergo thorough checks, and only meat meeting established food safety standards reaches the retail market.
Biosecurity remains the most effective defense against both ASF and FMD. Every producer, regardless of scale, must consistently implement the following measures:
Regarding the impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) on pig farming, although it usually causes relatively low mortality among pigs, its economic impact on the pork industry is significant. Outbreaks lead to movement restrictions that disrupt the normal flow of pigs through the production and processing chain, causing sudden regional shortages in some areas and surpluses in others.
One key lesson learned from these outbreaks is that preparedness for diseases extends far beyond the farm gate. Strong biosecurity, rapid disease detection and reporting, effective traceability, and close collaboration between producers, veterinarians, industry bodies, and government are essential prerequisites for limiting the consequences of future outbreaks.
For many years, South Africa's fight against African Swine Fever (ASF) has been based on fixed, legislated boundaries. According to the Animal Diseases Act (Act No. 35 of 1984), ASF is a strictly controlled and reportable disease.
Historically, the virus's presence was limited to specific zones of geographical control in the northern parts of the country, where strict movement controls helped manage the virus's natural reservoir. However, these geographical boundaries are no longer sufficient to protect the country's swine population today.
Animal health technician Kenneth Malatji notes that previously, ASF in South Africa was mainly confined to a legislatively controlled zone. Nevertheless, since 2019, outbreaks have spread far beyond the traditional control zone, affecting provinces such as Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Free State, North West, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, and Northern Cape.
This shift in boundaries reflects a global crisis. The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) indicates that ASF poses an unprecedented challenge to global pork production. For South African producers, the conclusion is clear: the line of control has moved, and farm-level biosecurity must evolve with it.
The movement of the control line is driven by a combination of natural biological factors and human behaviour. In traditional zones, the virus is maintained naturally through wild carriers, such as wild pigs and soft ticks (Ornithodoros species). As the range of these hosts expands, cases of virus transmission to domestic herds become more frequent.
Furthermore, according to the Department of Agriculture's National Strategy for Managing ASF, human activity is the main catalyst for the disease's spread across the country. Illegal movement of infected pigs, feeding on unboiled waste, and using contaminated equipment allow the virus to completely bypass geographical control boundaries.
Malatji emphasizes: 'As we said during Covid-19, the virus does not move; people move it. When you travel while infected, you carry the disease with you.'
This human-mediated transmission has triggered widespread epidemics. While early outbreaks in 2012 and 2016–2017 were localized, recent waves have penetrated deeper into the Western and Eastern Cape for the first time in recorded history, proving that legal boundaries alone are insufficient to ensure farm biosecurity.The economic damage from this boundary shift is severe for both commercial enterprises and rural communities. In the commercial sector, an outbreak leads to immediate catastrophic loss of value. Dr. Thandi Chappero, Head of Consumer Assurance at the South African Pork Producers Organisation (SAPPO), noted that a recent outbreak affected five commercial farms housing about 66,000 pigs, resulting in destroyed value of approximately 500 million rand.
Beyond direct livestock losses, outbreaks cause long-term export restrictions and local supply shortages, as disease management protocols require large-scale slaughter and sanitization. Local pork supply can remain restricted for 12–18 months.
For small and communal producers, the impact is immediate and personal. In poor regions, pigs serve as a financial safety net. Malatji explains: 'For many rural families, pigs function as a savings account. They are sold to pay for school fees, medical bills, household expenses, and crop costs. When ASF strikes, these financial guarantees vanish overnight.'
When official control boundaries shift, farm-level biosecurity becomes the producer's primary line of defense. Strict operational procedures are necessary to prevent viral ingress:
Domestic pigs must be completely isolated from wild hosts, stray animals, and other livestock using robust perimeter fencing and secure double-gated housing.
Before applying chemical disinfectants, all solid organic matter, such as dirt and manure, must be thoroughly cleaned and physically removed. Disinfectants cannot penetrate organic waste and will be ineffective when applied to dirty surfaces.
Chappero stresses: 'The most important step is the physical removal of all solid organic material before using disinfectants. No disinfectant can clean the virus out of a pile of dirt or feces.'
Pigs must not be fed untreated kitchen or animal waste. According to Regulation 24(1)(c) of the Animal Diseases Act (Act No. 35 of 1984), feeding pigs animal waste is prohibited unless it has been pre-boiled for at least 60 minutes or effectively sterilized.
Reserve stock must be purchased exclusively from reliable suppliers with verified health records. Always isolate and monitor newly arrived pigs in a dedicated quarantine facility for at least 28 days before integrating them into the main herd.
Swine keepers must act quickly if they suspect ASF or observe unexplained deaths. Chappero advises: 'Immediately report suspected ASF to your local provincial veterinarian. Isolate the herd and cease all movement between pens and off the farm. The sooner movements stop, the more economic value you save.'
Producers can protect trade continuity during regional outbreaks by registering in officially recognized biosecure swine sectors in accordance with Veterinary Procedure Notification 39 (VPN 39). This accreditation demonstrates disease-free status regardless of surrounding regional restrictions.
Managing ASF requires a realistic understanding of state support mechanisms. In its national strategic plan, the Department of Agriculture notes that relying on government compensation and culling as the primary control strategy is financially unsustainable. Uncontrolled culling addresses the symptoms of an outbreak, not its root cause, and standard compensation mechanisms rarely enable farmers to recover with adequate biosecurity. Consequently, international best practices prioritize biosecurity education and targeted containment over mass slaughter.
During outbreaks, state veterinary services coordinate directly with local municipal structures and the South African Police Service (SAPS) to establish localized movement controls, ensure quarantine, and manage the logistics of safe carcass disposal.
