At the end of March, China's Deputy Foreign Minister Hua Chunying led a large delegation to the UN headquarters in New York. The purpose of the visit was to persuade other states to support China's application to host the headquarters of the high seas treaty in the coastal city of Xiamen. Successful implementation of this initiative will lead to the creation of the first UN-affiliated office on Chinese territory.
China's active stance has drawn attention to an issue that might otherwise have remained inconspicuous, as the treaty is discussed primarily within circles of environmentalists and ocean specialists. Countries spent twenty years negotiating this treaty, which regulates the use and protection of biodiversity in the open sea—marine areas outside the jurisdiction of any country. This treaty is also known as the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) agreement.
The high seas represent a disputed zone due to numerous competing interests, including long-established industries such as deep-sea fishing, and new emerging fields, such as genetic prospecting and deep-sea mining. This historic treaty aims to ensure cooperation in protecting this common marine heritage.
Now that the treaty has entered into force, the inaugural conference of the parties to the agreement (COP1) may take place in January. One of the first tasks for participants will be determining the location of the secretariat headquarters. Competing with China are Chile, promoting its port city of Valparaíso, and the Brussels center of Belgium.
The treaty secretariat is an administrative body that assists member states in implementing the provisions of the agreement. It handles organizing meetings, preparing documents, and disseminating information—day-to-day work that can influence how the agreements are ultimately carried out.
A study conducted by Pallavi Kishore in 2011 compared the activities of treaty secretariats and pointed to the significant power of these structures. Kishore, a professor of international law at OP Jindal Global University in northwestern India, studied secretariats, including the UNFCCC. She assessed its role in shaping discussions on the working rules of the Kyoto Protocol.
Negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol collapsed at COP6 of the UNFCCC in 2000. When they resumed the following year, the secretariat presented a revised text for discussion, proposing solutions to several problems. This contributed to reaching a final consensus and adopting rules officially known as the Marrakech Agreements. The UNFCCC secretariat actively participated in these negotiations. As one of Kishore's staff quotes: 'No meeting was ever successful because of poor logistics. But if the logistics are poor, the negotiations can fail.'
Host states do not control the secretariat. Any member state can nominate a candidate for the position of Secretary-General, which becomes a vote when there are multiple contenders. Other staff are usually selected through standard hiring procedures. According to Kishore, the host country can theoretically exert pressure on secretariat staff of the same nationality, attempting to influence negotiations. However, she notes that geopolitically and economically strong states exert their influence regardless of the secretariat's location.
Insisting on locating everything within the same legal political culture means rejecting the diversity that exists in the world. In her 2009 article, 'Green Room Politics and the WTO Representation Crisis,' international trade expert Kent Jones describes how the World Trade Organization conducted exclusive preliminary negotiations since the 1970s. This served as a way for larger and more influential countries to maintain some control over the agenda. Kishore believes that the WTO has improved representation in its negotiations since then but adds that 'similar things can happen' in international talks.
When choosing a location for the secretariat, countries attach great importance to logistical aspects: internet access, office space, visa procedures, and access to scientific expertise that can support the treaty's work. Kishore emphasizes that as more countries claim the role of hosts, the world will have to become more prepared to host headquarters in regions with different political and legal systems. She repeats: 'If we say we want to locate everything within the same legal political culture, we are simply refusing to accept the diversity that exists in this world.'
Chile became the first country to enter this race, announcing its candidacy in 2023. This nation has long prided itself on leading the movement for marine environment conservation. During the Boric administration (2022–2026), Chile set an internal example by protecting half of its territorial waters from most human activities. Internationally, it led a global campaign to accelerate the creation of high-quality marine protected areas in the open sea.
However, the ruling far-right Cast administration, which came to power in March, suspended dozens of environmental measures approved under Boric, including the revocation of the decree that created these protected areas. Furthermore, it is considering repealing the Lafkenche Law, which laid the legal foundation for some indigenous-led marine conservation initiatives. President Cast argues that this law hinders salmon farming development. This suggests a possible shift in Chile's long-term approach to marine environment conservation, although the government maintains its commitment to the Valparaíso application.
Currently, Chile hosts several UN regional offices, but winning the battle for the high seas treaty headquarters would bring the first global UN body to Latin America. The Chilean government believes this could significantly strengthen the voice of the Global South in ocean governance.
Belgium presents itself as a reliable partner. Although Brussels is landlocked, it is already home to more than 40 international organizations and a significant part of the European Union government.
China emphasizes its commitment to multilateralism, as well as the symbolic significance of establishing the first UN organization headquartered in the Asia-Pacific region. Hua stated that China has offered to provide office space and accommodation in Xiamen free of charge, and to cover utility costs for the first five years. This would save the body at least $70 million over five years. China also pledged to contribute $3 million to the BBNJ dedicated fund to support delegates from developing countries; this is expected to be a one-time contribution. China presented the largest financial offer among the three contenders. Belgium also offered to cover office costs for the first five years and contribute $70,000 to the BBNJ fund. Chile stated it would provide the office 'at its own expense,' but did not specify the duration, and its own pledge to the BBNJ fund lacked a specific amount.
Most ocean governance organizations are based in the Global North: the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is in New York, USA; the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is located in Hamburg, Germany; the global shipping regulator, the International Maritime Organization, is based in London, England. The International Seabed Authority in Jamaica, in Kingston, is a rare exception.
'Earth Dialogue' spoke with numerous proponents and researchers working on marine issues in China. They all view China's attempt to play a more significant role in ocean governance positively, and that giving such a role to the world's largest fishing power could prompt China to be more ambitious in ocean protection.
China's application has also been subjected to critical analysis. Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Hub at the Institute of Asian Society Policy, noted that skepticism existed regarding Hua Chunying's visit to the UN in March. Li explained that this might be related to China's ambiguous reputation in global ocean governance. China owns the world's largest fleet of deep-sea fishing vessels, which often raises concerns about sustainability, legality, regulation, and oversight. Its resistance to creating new marine protected areas in Antarctica under the auspices of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Commission also cast doubt on China's commitment to nature conservation.
Some ocean advocates expressed concern over China's political influence. Chimei Yudong, a blue economy researcher at the National Marine Fund analytical center based in Delhi, stated that China's authoritarian system of governance could undermine the treaty's stated values, such as institutional transparency and significant civil society participation. Many NGOs publicly remain neutral regarding the location of the secretariat, but issues of neutrality, impartiality, and transparency remain key concerns.
Following China's presentation at the BBNJ meeting in New York in March, Ilka Wagner reminded attendees that the treaty promotes transparent decision-making. A German representative asked how China would ensure the participation of all delegates, experts, and civil society members. Hua replied: 'Rest assured, we welcome delegates from all countries at all levels, including NGOs.'
Li believes that 'China is very confident in its application.' However, he hopes that the outcome will not require a contentious vote at COP1 in January. Instead, the candidate countries could reach an agreement among themselves, sending a signal of unity in ocean governance: China could offer the secretariat's hardware (premises and auxiliary infrastructure), but then allow specialists with experience in operations and diplomacy from Chile and the European Union to manage it, as Li suggests—a 'more politically sophisticated outcome.'
Li concludes: 'There is a fundamental question behind this secretariat. Can China's actions dispel international concerns and justify global expectations?' While less than a year remains until a decision, the political struggle continues.
The spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lin Jian, communicated in a press conference that the message conveyed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during the China-ASEAN ministerial meeting in Manila was that the South China Sea should not affect the ties between the two blocs.
According to the version presented by Beijing, Wang Yi emphasized that the South China Sea constitutes a 'common home' for the region's nations. He stressed that both China and ASEAN possess the necessary capacity and wisdom to manage any disagreements, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and stability.
The head of Chinese diplomacy declared that the maritime issue should not become an impediment to relations between China and ASEAN, urging local countries to firmly maintain control over the initiative to preserve stability in these waters.
Lin also reported that China is willing to collaborate with ASEAN to remove 'interference factors' and expedite discussions regarding the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. This mechanism, which has been under negotiation for several years, aims to establish rules of conduct in a maritime area where Beijing holds sovereignty claims conflicting with several neighboring countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam.
These statements come amid intensifying tensions between China and the Philippines. This week saw exchanges of diplomatic protests following an incident near the Second Thomas Shoal, where Manila maintains the grounded Sierra Madre vessel, resulting in mutual accusations of aggression between the two countries.
Furthermore, there were divergences over another event in waters near the Scarborough Shoal, when the Chinese Coast Guard claimed to have repelled two official Philippine vessels.
The ASEAN meeting also featured the participation of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who met with Wang Yi. During this meeting, he recalled that Washington maintains a defense treaty with the Philippines.
China claims sovereignty over almost the entire extent of the South China Sea, which overlaps with territorial claims made by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.
