Regional Summit Leaders State Industrialization is Key to Economic Transformation in SADC

During the first-ever UN Peacebuilding Week, held in New York concurrently with the 20th anniversary of the UN peacebuilding architecture, there was limited participation from African specialists, despite Africa being the arena for over 40% of global conflicts.

UN Peacebuilding Week

The week, which took place from June 22 to June 26, 2026, marked a significant event in the institutional calendar of the United Nations. Under the slogan 'Partnership for innovation, inclusivity, and impact,' over 50 parallel sessions and events were held. This gathering was not merely a symbolic act but also a confirmation that peace remains a collective interest, and the system created to maintain it retains its relevance.

Key Discussion Themes

Four key areas emerged from the thematic discussions. The first is embedding peacebuilding through prevention. It was emphasized that prevention should serve as the linchpin of the entire program, asserting that prevention is a universal principle, and the UN system moved beyond viewing peacebuilding solely as a post-conflict issue.

Evidence of support for this agenda included the official submission of national prevention strategies to the UN Peacebuilding Commission by states such as São Tomé and Príncipe, Mauritania, Angola, and Papua New Guinea. However, authors note that such a strategy presented to a multilateral body does not guarantee operational capacity, funding, or political will for its implementation, and therefore must be based on existing local practices.

Technology and Artificial Intelligence

The sessions dedicated to technology proved to be some of the most refreshing, yet most unresolved. The discussion on peacebuilding through innovation, organized by the UN Global Compact, presented financing models for vulnerable regions and explored the application of AI as a catalyst for peace. Artificial intelligence has significant potential, for example, in early warning systems in Kenya built around the Uwiano for Peace platform, or in digital tools for documenting atrocities and mapping community needs in Syria.

Nevertheless, responsible use of AI tools in areas such as mediation, negotiation, and early warning requires trust, data sovereignty, a 'do no harm' approach, and human oversight. One persistent problem is the asymmetry in AI development: systems are predominantly trained on sources from Europe, North America, and in English, creating a data gap that initiatives like the Lacuna Fund are trying to address. A Microsoft representative acknowledged that most AI laboratories engage local participants only after the design phase, rather than during it, which distinguishes true co-design from previously developed external early warning systems lacking local involvement.

Fragmentation and Lack of African Frameworks

Another frequent topic was the need for a holistic approach to society and the entire peacebuilding system, yet little attention was paid to how existing mechanisms can be improved and linked without having to reinvent everything. For over ten years, the discourse on peacebuilding has been dominated by the same issues: isolated approaches, the link between local and global, inclusivity, financing, and partnerships. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these problems are being solved or if they have become permanent features of the system.

At a session on inclusive dialogue and partnerships in peacebuilding hubs, a sharp observation was made: the environment in New York represents not a true ecosystem, but a hierarchical, highly politicized system managed by member states. Participants called for connecting peacebuilding hubs, not duplicating them, and warned against mixing ecosystems with echo chambers.

The limited presence of African practitioners was noticeable throughout the week, even though Africa accounts for over 40% of global conflicts. UN Secretary-General Amina Mohammed reminded participants at the event that one cannot forget the people caught in conflict while UN actors are 'at 40,000 feet.' Furthermore, no session was built around African peacebuilding frameworks. The African Union's continental conflict prevention structure, including the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and related Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS), had limited visibility. The AU's 'Bullet Suppression' initiative was not included in any discussion, indicating a structural gap between the UN and regional mechanisms.

This gap reflects a deeper asymmetry in whose frameworks are considered benchmarks. AU tools, such as CSVRA, were designed to assert African ownership over how fragility and prevention are defined, yet sessions concerning Sudan, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa were almost exclusively based on typologies created by the UN. The practical consequence of this is that African institutions have to translate their own frameworks into UN terminology to be understood in these spaces, rather than vice versa. To bridge this gap, UN organizers must actively integrate AU and regional economic community tools into the design of sessions from the outset.

Participation and Support

Consistent representation from Kenya was a notable exception to the insufficient African presence, as it sponsored at least six events with substantial participation. In contrast, the AU Observer Mission at the UN sponsored only two events, and regional economic communities were absent. Among major powers such as Turkey, India, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, there was a significant absence as organizers or main participants. The strongest multilateral commitment was demonstrated by Scandinavian countries, EU member states, the UK, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, and South Korea, facilitated by sustained financial support.

System Accountability

These four conclusions point to a system that has generally reached correct normative conclusions: prevention is universal, peacebuilding must belong to local populations, technology must be human-centered, and financing must be flexible and long-term. Few in the room would dispute these points. However, the distance between these norms and institutional habits remains a central problem. In a civil society dialogue organized by ACCORD, Vasu Gunden noted that almost none of the current peacebuilding architectures predate 1990. The peacebuilding fund, mediation support structures, and peacekeeping operations were created by a generation determined to build a different world.

Young professionals attending the Peacebuilding Week enter a much more complex era: increasing transnational violence with the resurgence of proxy actors fighting for ports, minerals, and loyalty, more transactional approaches to conflict resolution, and a multilateral order under greater pressure. The first UN Peacebuilding Week showed that the system is still capable of gathering participants, providing evidence, and generating cross-sectoral exchange. The test for the coming years is whether it can hold itself accountable to its stated commitments with the same rigor it applies to the conflicts it studies. This requires political engagement, coalition building, mutual accountability, and the ability to sustain collective action over the long term. This scrutiny must be applied to the UN architecture itself as closely as it is to the fragile states it seeks to assist.

According to a new report by the Bureau of Economic Research (BER), South Africa's mining industry is failing to utilize one of the world's largest mineral reserves due to administrative inefficiencies, regulatory delays, and policy uncertainty, rather than a lack of resources.

Industry Potential and Challenges

South Africa's mineral wealth is estimated to be between $2.5 trillion (R41 trillion) and $4.7 trillion (R77 trillion). However, according to independent consultant Robert Botha, this resource continues to operate significantly below its potential due to structural weaknesses in the application of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA).

Botha emphasized that the long-term stagnation of the industry is caused by regulatory friction, political instability, and administrative backlogs, not by the depletion of geological reserves. The report, based on an analysis of the operational mechanisms of MPRDA 28 from 2002 (with amendments) and data from industry participants, proposes possible legislative changes to unlock frozen capital, stimulate initial exploration work, and increase investor confidence.

Legislative Uncertainty

The legal framework governing South Africa's mineral complex is at a critical juncture due to increased political uncertainty. The report notes that the initial draft of the Mineral Resources Development Act 2025, published on August 13, 2025, was officially withdrawn by state authorities following strong and widespread opposition from industry stakeholders.

Although the withdrawal was acknowledged as a necessary step consistent with previous recommendations, it created a policy vacuum marked by intense speculation and conflicting information regarding the content of the future revised draft.

New Strategies and Delays

The situation is complicated by overlapping institutional structures. On June 8, 2026, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC) presented the Industrial Development Strategy for 2026, which aims to change the structure of incentives for the mining sector in exploration, extraction, processing, and investment. This strategy directly calls for a revision of mining legislation to enable the government to set strict conditions for mineral rights allocation to ensure local raw material processing.

Concurrently, the regulatory environment faces constant structural delays. At the Junior Mining Indaba in Johannesburg on June 9, 2026, the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) announced the fifth postponement of the full implementation of the national online cadastral system, moving the target date to March 31, 2027.

Administrative Barriers and Financial Losses

Administrative friction within the DMRE acts as an indirect cost to investments in the mining industry. Following the structural transition to state management under MPRDA and failures in subsequent internal administrative systems, such as SAMRAD, which suffered from external information factors, lack of transparency, and application errors, the state has accumulated significant administrative debt.

The financial damage from this administrative paralysis is enormous. According to a targeted industry survey conducted by the South African Minerals Council in 2021 among 21 operating companies, 178 unfinished license applications are stalled, representing over R30 billion in active, planned capital expenditure.

The primary reason for this systemic delay is the absence of mandatory performance standards regulating the state apparatus within the text of the MPRDA. While the Act regularly sets strict, non-negotiable compliance deadlines for private sector applicants, it systematically excludes mandatory timeframes for internal assessment and approval mechanisms by the state.

Opportunities for Stability Restoration

As developers finalize the revised Mineral Resources Development Act, there is a critical window of opportunity to correct this trend. The state can restore necessary policy certainty to attract long-term global capital by enshrining strict legislative timelines across all licensing processes, codifying judicial precedents to protect capital mobility, and limiting unilateral ministerial powers.

The report concludes that combining these legislative amendments with robust institutional anti-corruption measures will be crucial for restoring a healthy and transparent project pipeline. Ultimately, resolving these constraining factors is not merely an administrative cleanup but a macroeconomic imperative that can cement South Africa's mining industry status as a rising sector.