A figure of $15 million appeared in two completely different international stories last week, demonstrating how the same sum of money can be both a significant incentive and a financial obstacle.
A figure of $15 million appeared in two completely different international stories last week, demonstrating how the same sum of money can be both a significant incentive and a financial obstacle.
It is reported that Spain, which recently became the FIFA World Cup champion, risks losing nearly $15 million from its prize fund due to US taxes. After defeating Argentina at the FIFA World Cup 2026, Spain received a record prize of $50 million from FIFA. However, sources indicate that the team's composition may fall under federal tax obligations for income earned during the tournament, as a significant part of the event took place on US territory.
It is estimated that Spain could lose about $15 million if the maximum withholding rate of 30% is applied. Currently, US politicians are discussing the proposed tax package. Proponents of this measure argue that foreign athletes should be subject to the same tax laws as Americans, while opponents believe it unduly burdens international athletes.
In parallel, the US Department of State is offering a reward of up to $15 million for credible information that helps expose the financial activities of a network allegedly linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran.
This incentive is provided under the 'Rewards for Justice' program. It aims to gather data on individuals, companies, and financial channels suspected of assisting the IRGC in acquiring sensitive goods and evading international sanctions. US officials state that over the past decade, the target network has facilitated money laundering and procurement operations benefiting the IRGC and associated military structures.
Participants in the program may also be eligible for additional security and resettlement assistance if they disclose information leading to the disruption of this network. Thus, the identical sum of $15 million attracted attention, illustrating two completely different applications of money on the international stage, despite the complete unrelatedness of these events: one represents a possible reduction in the championship prize, and the other serves as an incentive in Washington's ongoing campaign against networks accused of financing the IRGC.
South Africans are becoming accustomed to the term 'gas shortage' amid increased pressure to take measures ahead of the expected gas deficit. A significant portion of the gas consumed is imported from southern Mozambique, coming from the Pande-Temane fields via the pipeline operated by Republic of Mozambique Pipeline Investments Company (Rompco) into the Mpumalanga province of South Africa.
Gas holds strategic importance as it is not merely another fuel in the energy balance. Although natural gas accounts for only about 2.5% of South Africa's total energy supply, its role is critical. Approximately 35–40% of the gas from Pande-Temane is used at Sasol facilities in Secunda, where the South African chemical and energy company converts coal and natural gas into synthetic fuel and chemical raw materials.
Another 35–40% is directed to the Sasolburg chemical complex, where natural gas is used in production processes for chemicals such as wax, methanol, and ammonia. The remainder is distributed among industrial and commercial consumers. Furthermore, Sasol annually sells about 20–23 petajoules of methane gas to clients in South Africa, including steel, sugar, paper, and motor manufacturers.
Thus, the 'gas shortage' should be viewed not only as an energy supply problem but also as a risk to industrial policy, food security, and production competitiveness. Globally, natural gas provides about 70% of ammonia production and 55–65% of methanol production; ammonia is essential for fertilizers, and fertilizers are necessary for food production. Methanol serves as a basis for the chemical industry. In the context of South Africa, gas also supports the operation of furnaces, kilns, boilers, and technological plants in sectors such as metallurgy, glassmaking, ceramics, brewing, and synthetic fuel production.
A reduction in gas supplies will require more than just a change of fuel. Affected companies may have to redesign production processes, install new storage and processing systems, accept higher operating costs, and, in some cases, switch to alternatives with higher emission levels.
According to estimates by the South African Industrial Gas Users Association, alternatives such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), diesel, or electricity could cost two to five times more than the current price of gas, excluding capital expenditure for retrofitting. The consequences for industry and employment are considerable: industries dependent on this gas supply directly provide jobs for approximately 70,000–100,000 people. Sasol's broader contribution to the South African economy is even greater: in 2021, its contribution was estimated at about 5% of GDP, supporting around 500,000 direct and indirect jobs.
The country may require 300–400 petajoules of gas per year, equivalent to 6–8 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG), to meet industrial heating and power generation needs. Consequently, current supplies are insufficient. In this situation, procrastination is not a passive stance, as it increases the risk of price hikes, industrial weakening, and heightened energy insecurity.
A policy framework and infrastructure are being developed for gas imports. The publication of the draft Gas Management Plan points to Richards Bay in South Africa as a key LNG import location, while Matola in Mozambique is considered a regional supply source. Projects for terminals in both locations have passed the permitting stage, and procurement negotiations are underway. However, each of these initiatives requires several years of work, while the gap between the country's current state and the required level is constantly narrowing. The 'gas shortage' is only a few years away, leaving little time for further delays.
The primary and most urgent option is LNG import. A study conducted by the independent non-profit economic research institute Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS) in March 2026 clearly shows that South Africa must secure LNG imports in the short and medium term. While domestic resources may help later, they are incapable of closing the short-term gap.
The LNG strategy must be practical, not symbolic. The ports of Durban and Richards Bay, two major commercial ports in South Africa (in KwaZulu-Natal), can serve as LNG import terminals, but the existing pipeline infrastructure is insufficient to meet domestic demand. Therefore, South Africa needs a second import route through Mozambique, via the ports of Matola or Inhasso, to connect to the existing infrastructure serving the eastern interior of the country. Matola is at a more advanced stage, having received permits and environmental approvals.
The report's priority is a two-terminal strategy: one LNG terminal in Mozambique for access to Rompco and the domestic gas market, and a second in KwaZulu-Natal to serve the electricity and industrial demand in KwaZulu-Natal. Both must be secured and commissioned by mid-2030. Regional and domestic gas sources remain important but are not an immediate salvation. Timelines, costs, distance to infrastructure, and regulatory delays mean that current domestic resources cannot save South Africa before the crisis hits.
Demand-side measures are also important. Some users may switch to LPG, diesel, electricity, transported LNG, or compressed natural gas (CNG). Biomethane, green hydrogen, and electrification can help over time. However, the report is realistic: many alternatives are expensive, technically immature, logistically complex, or have higher emissions. South Africa's effective carbon tax, which rises from R35/tonne ($2 USD) in 2024 to R115/tonne ($7 USD) in 2030, alone will not force mass substitution.
South Africa needs a credible gas plan linked to procurement, infrastructure, and industrial policy. The draft Gas Management Plan for South Africa has already outlined the scale of potential future demand: about 400 petajoules per year inland by 2050 and another 350 PJ per year in coastal areas. Now, this planning must move into execution.
The Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, regulators, state-owned companies, and private investors must develop a clear LNG-to-power strategy. It must define how much gas the country will need, who will buy it, how it will be priced and stored, and how supplies can be regulated based on changing demand.
The regulatory system also needs reform. The TIPS report calls for clearer rules regarding what assessments companies must conduct before obtaining environmental approval for offshore oil and gas projects. It also proposes creating a specialized tribunal to resolve disputes over these permits. Broader environmental assessments can help identify suitable areas for development. Maritime spatial planning is also required to manage the competing use of South Africa's ocean space.
These points are not bureaucratic footnotes; they determine whether investment comes before or after the crisis. First and foremost, South Africa needs coordination. The report calls for the creation of a dedicated delivery structure. This could be a new workflow similar to Operation Vulindlela—a government initiative aimed at modernizing the country's electricity, water, transport, and digital communication networks. Or it could be a Rompco-style mechanism, uniting the state and private sector under the coordination of a single gas aggregator.
A critical analysis of the required policy, regulation, procurement, infrastructure, and resource development shows that decisions must be made in the next few years to avoid a gas supply deficit after 2030. Many of these actions have long development and construction timelines and are highly interdependent. Delays in permitting, approval processes, LNG procurement, terminal development, or domestic gas projects can significantly affect South Africa's ability to secure alternative gas supplies before existing reserves decline. Therefore, early action is necessary to ensure that import infrastructure and production capacity are ready in time to support future gas demand and maintain energy security after 2030. The call to action is simple: decide now, procure now, permit now, build now. The crisis will not wait for the next plan.
If a landlord in Dubai intends to sell the leased property, there are strict legal requirements for the tenant eviction procedure, even if the lease agreement has not yet expired.
According to Dubai legislation, a landlord can only demand vacating the premises under specific circumstances, particularly upon the expiration of the lease term. However, the seller's intention does not void the existing lease agreement; it remains binding on both parties until its end, and any buyer acquires the property taking into account the rights of the current tenant.
If the landlord wishes the tenant to vacate the premises for the purpose of sale, they are obligated to notify of this reason for eviction at least twelve months before the intended eviction date. This notification must be delivered through a notary or registered mail. Although the courier service Tableegh is often used to deliver the notarized notice, the law requires adherence to these formalities.
This requirement is stipulated in Article 25(2)(d) of the Amended Dubai Land Law. Furthermore, Article 28 of Law No. (26) of 2007, which regulates landlord-tenant relations in the Emirate of Dubai, states that the transfer of ownership of the leased property to a new owner should not affect the tenant's right to continue residing in the property according to the contract concluded with the previous owner, provided the lease term is fixed.
In case of non-compliance with these legally established requirements, the tenant has the right to defend their rights at the Dubai Rental Dispute Center (RDC).
