Supply chains in South Africa are facing serious disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions and growing cyber threats. Amid rising costs and increasing operational complexity, businesses are forced to strategically adapt to secure their future.
The Goal of the 'Made in Africa' Initiative
A central theme at the XIII Industrial Indaba, held in Sandton on July 14 and 15 under the slogan 'Made in Africa: Scaling Growth and Shaping Trade,' was the gap between what Africa extracts or grows and what it actually produces. Deputy President Paul Mashatile and several government and industry representatives used this platform to reiterate an old goal: Africa must stop exporting raw materials and start supplying finished goods.
The Economy of Value Chains
The example of a value chain, such as a cup of coffee, clearly illustrates this problem. The farmer grows and harvests the beans, but before anyone drinks the beverage, the beans must be roasted, ground, packaged, branded, and sold, and profit is made at each of these stages. According to government data, industry already accounts for about 13 percent of South Africa's economy and provides over 1.6 million direct jobs. Nevertheless, Statistics South Africa reported in June that the sector contracted by 0.8 percent in the first quarter of 2026, marking the second consecutive quarterly decline.
Ambitions for industrialization are not new. Only the urgency has changed, as officials increasingly use the term 'reindustrialization,' which more honestly acknowledges South Africa's loss of a significant portion of its production capacity, which it is now trying to recover.
Lessons from Indonesia with Nickel
If African governments are looking for a living example of what serious value-added policy can achieve and where it might fail, the Indonesian nickel sector is an obvious benchmark. In 2014, Jakarta banned the export of unprocessed nickel ore, strengthened this restriction in 2020, and supported it with industrial parks, tax holidays, and foreign investment—much of which was Chinese—with the aim of building domestic processing capacity.
The results have been impressive: Indonesia's nickel-related exports grew from approximately $6 billion in 2013 to nearly $30 billion by 2022. The growth was driven by the export of refined products, steel, and battery materials. The country now supplies over half of the world's nickel production, a level of market concentration few resource-rich nations have achieved in a single commodity category.
Challenges of the African Market
In contrast, Africa holds nearly a third of the world's known mineral reserves, yet according to an analysis by the Atlantic Council, only 2.8 percent of global foreign direct investment was attracted to critical mineral processing between 2019 and 2023. This imbalance is what the 'Made in Africa' rhetoric attempts to correct. However, the Indonesian model was not without costs and controversy. The European Union challenged the nickel export ban at the World Trade Organization, and the dispute panel found that it violated trade rules, although the paralyzed WTO appeals system rendered the decision practically meaningless.
At the local level, Zimbabwe's attempt to replicate the Indonesian approach by restricting raw lithium exports encountered a more distinctly African problem: mining companies were reluctant to build processing plants without reliable infrastructure for electricity, water, and transport. These are the very gaps that reindustrialization policy should address, but which often cannot be closed quickly enough to meet export ban deadlines. The conclusion is not that export restrictions and local content mandates do not work, but that they are only effective when combined with an invisible, capital-intensive foundation of energy, logistics, and finance, and in that order.
The Question of People and Entrepreneurs
Here, the rhetoric of the Industrial Indaba faces the same test that undermined previous South African industrial strategies. Linda Matuvane, one of the event organizers, and Kamil Ali, press secretary to the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition Parks Tau, spoke about involving entrepreneurs from slums and small producers in supply chains currently dominated by large firms. This is the right instinct. However, it is also the part of industrial policy that is constantly underfunded compared to the incentives provided to large investors.
A small producer cannot simply wish to enter a multinational corporation's supply chain; they require affordable financing, reliable electricity, and real contracts that the conference panel cannot provide. Modern factories, meanwhile, increasingly rely on automation and digital systems to maintain competitiveness, meaning that the jobs created may bear little resemblance to the linear labor promised by old industrial strategies. Fewer jobs on the production line, more demand for technicians and machine operators—a shift that benefits ordinary workers only if quality training channels are established well before the factories begin operating.
Myths About Local Production
There is also a myth concerning consumers that needs dispelling. Local products are not necessarily cheaper than imports. South African factories still have to import equipment, chemicals, and components, pay for electricity and financing, and often operate at smaller scales than international competitors, which can make local goods more expensive, at least initially. This is not necessarily evidence of policy failure. The country can reasonably decide that a small increase in the price of a local product is worth it for creating jobs, skills, and industrial potential in the long run. But this trade-off must be honestly communicated to consumers, rather than presented as an automatic discount, which South African politicians have not always demonstrated discipline in doing.
Challenges of Sustainability and Digitalization
South Africa's current industrial strategy rests on three pillars: decarbonizing product output due to tightening carbon rules in international markets for traded goods, diversifying to reduce dependence on volatile commodity prices, and digitizing production to maintain competitiveness. Each of these points is a valid response to real external pressure. However, each is costly, and the enterprises that can afford cleaner equipment and digital upgrades are the large incumbent players who are already best positioned to benefit from the 'Made in Africa' policy, while the small producers that officials want to include often cannot cover the initial costs.
A credible industrial strategy must account for this contradiction, rather than assuming that decarbonization, diversification, and industrial inclusion move in the same direction by default.
The True Test of the Concept
None of the above means that the fundamental instinct behind 'Made in Africa' is wrong. A continent that continues to export ore and import finished goods made from that same ore with a significant markup is not building an economy that reduces unemployment or protects itself from commodity price fluctuations. The Indonesian example demonstrates what can be achieved when export policy, infrastructure investment, and industrial planning act in concert over a long period. It also shows that benefits concentrate where capital and contracts are directed—this is precisely the question African governments have yet to answer convincingly. The conference slogan and declaration will not train a technician, electrify an industrial park, or secure the first order for a slum supplier. 'Made in Africa' becomes more than just rhetoric only when the jobs, ownership, and contracts it creates become visible to the people for whom this policy is intended.