Israel's idea of transforming into the key trade center of the Middle East faces serious difficulties as regional powers actively create competing transport routes bypassing Israel.
Alternative Trade Initiatives
In June, ministers of transport from Saudi Arabia and Turkey signed memorandums on reviving the Ottoman-era Hejaz Railway. This corridor is intended to connect countries through Jordan and Syria, deliberately bypassing Israel. Furthermore, the UAE began negotiations for a trade route that will run from the Syrian coast through Iraq to its own ports in the Persian Gulf.
In July, DP World signed a fifty-year concession with the Fujairah authorities for the construction of two terminals on the Arabian Sea coast of the UAE, including the Al Rugailet container port. The goal of this project is to ensure the ability to unload and move cargo without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Conflict with IMEC
These new projects completely ignore the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). IMEC was announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, just four weeks before the start of the war in Gaza, and its foundation was Haifa as a gateway to Europe. Although proponents still refer to it as 'suspended,' what is being built instead is shaping a regional order where trade passes through everyone except Israel.
IMEC was Washington's response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. It envisioned transporting Indian goods by sea to the UAE, then overland by rail through Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and subsequently from Haifa to Europe. The basis of this concept was the normalization of relations between the Gulf states and Israel, intended to provide economic support to the Abraham Accords.
Reasons for IMEC's Stoppage
The situation in Gaza halted the Jordanian segment before even a meter of track was laid, and the political condition became unattainable as Saudi Arabia refused normalization without recognizing a Palestinian state. Moreover, the current war against Iran has damaged the physical vision that Gaza held for politics. Israeli ports and power plants have been subjected to prolonged rocket and drone shelling.
There was also a scale issue. Before the war, the Port of Haifa processed about 1.5 million containers per year, which was far from the scale anticipated by its supporters. Tying the trade of the Gulf states to Israel meant tying it to a country in a state of constant war and with insufficient capacity.
Division Among Gulf States
The Gulf states are divided along existing fault lines. Saudi Arabia has spent a decade trying to establish itself as an indispensable regional node, and the war has intensified these efforts. In March, Saudi Railways launched a specialized freight corridor over 1,700 kilometers on an existing line. This was a direct reaction to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, linking King Abdulaziz Port, King Fahd Industrial Port, and Jubail Commercial Port with the border of Jordan.
Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi continue to develop corridors, but none of these countries can currently provide an open route against Israel; they are merely drawing maps, not building strategy. Additionally, there is the east-west oil artery Petroline to Yanbu, running from the Abqaiq refining complex in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port. Production promoted by Aramco reached a record seven million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026.
If sufficient trade, oil, and corporate teams must physically pass through the kingdom, it cannot be sidelined by Israel, Iran, or anyone else. The June memorandums with Ankara extend this logic to land.
UAE and Iraq Strategy
Abu Dhabi's response, meanwhile, bypasses both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Where Riyadh seeks to be the sole point through which trade must pass, Abu Dhabi is creating routes that touch as many coasts as possible, independent of any single one. The AD Ports group opened a line connecting Khalifa Port with Umm Qasr in Iraq, feeding the $17 billion Developing Road, which runs from Grand Faw Port in Basra through Turkey to Europe, reaching the Mediterranean without crossing Saudi Arabia or entering Israel.
Iraq is also advancing a similar logic inland. In mid-July, it presented the Energy City on the Faw Peninsula, connecting refineries, gas plants, and power stations to the Developing Road. It presented this project to major US energy companies, such as Chevron and Halliburton, in Houston. Officials from the UAE and Syria subsequently began talks to extend the corridor to Syrian ports, with a proposed logistics hub at the al-Tanf crossing. To the east, the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline is being expanded so that oil can reach tankers in Fujairah on the Oman Gulf without transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. Completion of this phase is planned for 2027.
Limitations of Land Routes
Both models face two main obstacles. First, scale: the volumes that make these routes worth fighting for move by sea, and land cannot replace this. One container ship can carry up to 24,000 TEUs. The China-Europe railway express, the most developed land freight network on Earth, transported a record two million containers in all of 2024, but its China-Europe segment fell by 22 percent in the first half of 2025 due to the cheapening of sea transport.
Cargo returns to water when the water is open. Only Jebel Ali transported 15.5 million containers in 2024. Iraq's main container port, Umm Qasr, handled about 1.5 million in 2023, and its channel is too shallow to accommodate vessels above approximately 5,000 TEUs. Its trade is unidirectional: Iraq's exports consist almost entirely of crude oil sent by tankers, not in boxes, so most arriving full containers return empty. Land corridors provide backup and political reach, but they do not move the cargo itself.
The second limitation is Iran. When the Strait of Hormuz closed, Gulf production dropped to about 7.5 million barrels of oil per day in March compared to the normal rate of 20 million, and the UAE was among the most affected Gulf states. Abu Dhabi's response, hidden behind a public stance of deterrence, reportedly involved paying for Iranian protection. By mid-June, according to a Reuters report, the UAE transferred more than $3 billion to Tehran and agreed to release up to $10 billion in frozen funds in exchange for a cessation of attacks, although UAE officials categorically denied this transfer. Since then, customs clearance for Iranian goods stuck in Jebel Ali has resumed.
The power that directs money to a state capable of closing its ports and keeping them open partially through goods from that same state does not build independence; it rents it. Meanwhile, Riyadh, having rejected US requests to use Saudi airspace for strikes against Iran, restored crude oil exports to about 90 percent of pre-war levels by early July as ties with Iran strengthened.
Inevitability of Israeli Influence
Rejecting Israel's role as a trade hub does not mean excluding it as a factor. Israel retains what none of the corridor builders possess: military potential to achieve and undermine any unwanted route—and it does not approve of any route that strengthens its rivals or excludes it from the process.
A century ago, regional integration projects were repeatedly destroyed by imperial powers and the states these powers established at the crossroads of three continents. Names have changed, and maps have become glossy, but the dynamic remains the same. During the war with Iran, Israel deployed Iron Dome batteries and its own groups to the UAE—for the first time, the system went beyond Israeli territory with attached troops. This means that the state attempting to build a corridor around Israel needed an Israeli battery for survival against Iranian missiles.
Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi may continue to draw corridors, but until now, none of them can provide an open route against Israel; they are merely drawing maps, not building strategy.