The Telkom Group did not achieve the planned financial indicators for the 2026 fiscal year in terms of revenue, profit, and free cash flow. Nevertheless, most senior executives received short-term bonuses exceeding target amounts, according to a recently published group remuneration report.
The group performance assessment card, which determines the majority of management bonuses, showed a result of 73.2% for the year ending March 31, 2026. During this period, Telkom reported significantly higher total income, driven by cost discipline and one-off receipts from the previous year, but revenue growth was unsatisfactory.
Group revenue amounted to 44.5 billion rupees, which was below the target of 46.9 billion rupees and even below the minimum threshold of 46.3 billion rupees. Profit after tax before bonuses was 4.1 billion rupees, falling short of the target of 4.5 billion rupees, and free cash flow reached 3.1 billion rupees, remaining slightly below the set target.
The performance card was saved by all non-financial indicators. The completion of strategic projects received the maximum score of 150% after approved initiatives were completed six months ahead of schedule. The ESG component exceeded its planned targets: carbon emissions decreased by 27% compared to the target of 4.2–4.99%, aided by Telkom's energy program. Furthermore, the proportion of women in management reached 37.3%, surpassing the target of 37%. The Openserve company connected 122,910 fiber optic sites against a target of 100,000.
However, financial metrics constitute 65% of the weight in the performance card, and this is where the discrepancy between operational results and payments appears. Group CEO Serame Taukobong received a bonus of 10 million rupees, slightly below his target of 10.5 million rupees and identical to the amount of 10 million rupees he received the previous year. He was the only executive whose bonuses were below target.
CFO Nonkululeko Dlamini received 6.4 million rupees against a target of 5.8 million rupees, representing 109% of the target. Head of the group's digital division, Sello Mmakau, Head of Corporate Affairs Mpho MakNimi, and HR Manager Melody Lekota received bonuses ranging from 109% to 117% of their targets.
In total, the short-term bonuses paid to the management team increased by 18% compared to the previous year, rising from 34.9 million rupees to 41.1 million rupees. Business unit leaders who performed well received the largest benefits. Telkom Consumer CEO Lunga Siyo received a bonus of 6.6 million rupees, which is 130% of his target, thanks to the unit's 90% score and leading mobile connectivity market growth. Additionally, he received a retention compensation of 6.3 million rupees in July 2025 under a new retention scheme approved by the board of directors to address the 'talent retention risk', bringing Siyo's total annual income to 20.9 million rupees, approaching Taukobong's 24 million rupees.
Beauty Apleni, appointed as CEO of Openserve in July 2025, received 5.6 million rupees, which is 157% of her target bonus, after her division achieved a 124% score in its performance card, ensuring the first revenue growth in nine years.
The Remuneration Committee, chaired by Brian Kennedy, stated that it had 'duly and carefully considered' the need for discretion and 'concluded that discretion was not required'. It should be noted that the only discretion available to the committee under Telkom's policy is a downward adjustment, allowing bonus results to be reduced to 15% in exceptional circumstances.
The report does not disclose the mathematical formula by which the group rating of 73.2%, weighted at 80% for most head office executives, translates into payments significantly exceeding target levels. The remaining 20% depends on individual performance, and each executive who received a bonus was assigned an individual rating of '2' on the five-point group scale, where 'exceptional' is at the top and 'unsatisfactory' is at the bottom.
The report is not solely a story of rewards without results. Jonas Bogoshi, long-term CEO of BCX, received no bonus. His division scored only 37% on its divisional performance card: revenue from eight priority BCX client accounts decreased by 4% against a target growth of 8%. He left the group at the end of February 2026 with a severance package of 2.8 million rupees, vacation pay of 230,173 rupees, and 11.2 million rupees in pro-rata shares, totaling an annual income of 19.9 million rupees.
Regarding the long-term incentive plan, it proved unfavorable. The 2022 shares completely failed to meet performance conditions: achieving 82.9% of the overall shareholder return, total income, and return on equity conditions resulted in zero vesting. Under the 2021 and 2022 schemes, 7.1 million out of 8.8 million shares—81%—were cancelled. The value of Taukobong's vested shares dropped from 13.4 million rupees in the 2025 fiscal year to 3.5 million rupees, which was the main reason for the decrease in his total income from 33.3 million rupees to 24 million rupees. The total income of the management team as a whole decreased compared to the previous year, from 122.3 million rupees to 116.1 million rupees.
Broad segments of the workforce are entitled to a bonus fund of 797 million rupees, set at 14.1% of pre-bonus profit and distributed among all eligible employees. Employees in production units received a 5.5% salary increase under the latest three-year agreement.
Shareholders showed slight reluctance to object. At the Annual General Meeting in August 2025, Telkom's remuneration policy was approved by 97.87%, and its implementation report by 98.27%, which the committee describes as encouraging support. Whether this support will be maintained will be tested at this year's Annual General Meeting.
Israel's idea of transforming into the key trade center of the Middle East faces serious difficulties as regional powers actively create competing transport routes bypassing Israel.
In June, ministers of transport from Saudi Arabia and Turkey signed memorandums on reviving the Ottoman-era Hejaz Railway. This corridor is intended to connect countries through Jordan and Syria, deliberately bypassing Israel. Furthermore, the UAE began negotiations for a trade route that will run from the Syrian coast through Iraq to its own ports in the Persian Gulf.
In July, DP World signed a fifty-year concession with the Fujairah authorities for the construction of two terminals on the Arabian Sea coast of the UAE, including the Al Rugailet container port. The goal of this project is to ensure the ability to unload and move cargo without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
These new projects completely ignore the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). IMEC was announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, just four weeks before the start of the war in Gaza, and its foundation was Haifa as a gateway to Europe. Although proponents still refer to it as 'suspended,' what is being built instead is shaping a regional order where trade passes through everyone except Israel.
IMEC was Washington's response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. It envisioned transporting Indian goods by sea to the UAE, then overland by rail through Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and subsequently from Haifa to Europe. The basis of this concept was the normalization of relations between the Gulf states and Israel, intended to provide economic support to the Abraham Accords.
The situation in Gaza halted the Jordanian segment before even a meter of track was laid, and the political condition became unattainable as Saudi Arabia refused normalization without recognizing a Palestinian state. Moreover, the current war against Iran has damaged the physical vision that Gaza held for politics. Israeli ports and power plants have been subjected to prolonged rocket and drone shelling.
There was also a scale issue. Before the war, the Port of Haifa processed about 1.5 million containers per year, which was far from the scale anticipated by its supporters. Tying the trade of the Gulf states to Israel meant tying it to a country in a state of constant war and with insufficient capacity.
The Gulf states are divided along existing fault lines. Saudi Arabia has spent a decade trying to establish itself as an indispensable regional node, and the war has intensified these efforts. In March, Saudi Railways launched a specialized freight corridor over 1,700 kilometers on an existing line. This was a direct reaction to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, linking King Abdulaziz Port, King Fahd Industrial Port, and Jubail Commercial Port with the border of Jordan.
Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi continue to develop corridors, but none of these countries can currently provide an open route against Israel; they are merely drawing maps, not building strategy. Additionally, there is the east-west oil artery Petroline to Yanbu, running from the Abqaiq refining complex in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port. Production promoted by Aramco reached a record seven million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026.
If sufficient trade, oil, and corporate teams must physically pass through the kingdom, it cannot be sidelined by Israel, Iran, or anyone else. The June memorandums with Ankara extend this logic to land.
Abu Dhabi's response, meanwhile, bypasses both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Where Riyadh seeks to be the sole point through which trade must pass, Abu Dhabi is creating routes that touch as many coasts as possible, independent of any single one. The AD Ports group opened a line connecting Khalifa Port with Umm Qasr in Iraq, feeding the $17 billion Developing Road, which runs from Grand Faw Port in Basra through Turkey to Europe, reaching the Mediterranean without crossing Saudi Arabia or entering Israel.
Iraq is also advancing a similar logic inland. In mid-July, it presented the Energy City on the Faw Peninsula, connecting refineries, gas plants, and power stations to the Developing Road. It presented this project to major US energy companies, such as Chevron and Halliburton, in Houston. Officials from the UAE and Syria subsequently began talks to extend the corridor to Syrian ports, with a proposed logistics hub at the al-Tanf crossing. To the east, the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline is being expanded so that oil can reach tankers in Fujairah on the Oman Gulf without transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. Completion of this phase is planned for 2027.
Both models face two main obstacles. First, scale: the volumes that make these routes worth fighting for move by sea, and land cannot replace this. One container ship can carry up to 24,000 TEUs. The China-Europe railway express, the most developed land freight network on Earth, transported a record two million containers in all of 2024, but its China-Europe segment fell by 22 percent in the first half of 2025 due to the cheapening of sea transport.
Cargo returns to water when the water is open. Only Jebel Ali transported 15.5 million containers in 2024. Iraq's main container port, Umm Qasr, handled about 1.5 million in 2023, and its channel is too shallow to accommodate vessels above approximately 5,000 TEUs. Its trade is unidirectional: Iraq's exports consist almost entirely of crude oil sent by tankers, not in boxes, so most arriving full containers return empty. Land corridors provide backup and political reach, but they do not move the cargo itself.
The second limitation is Iran. When the Strait of Hormuz closed, Gulf production dropped to about 7.5 million barrels of oil per day in March compared to the normal rate of 20 million, and the UAE was among the most affected Gulf states. Abu Dhabi's response, hidden behind a public stance of deterrence, reportedly involved paying for Iranian protection. By mid-June, according to a Reuters report, the UAE transferred more than $3 billion to Tehran and agreed to release up to $10 billion in frozen funds in exchange for a cessation of attacks, although UAE officials categorically denied this transfer. Since then, customs clearance for Iranian goods stuck in Jebel Ali has resumed.
The power that directs money to a state capable of closing its ports and keeping them open partially through goods from that same state does not build independence; it rents it. Meanwhile, Riyadh, having rejected US requests to use Saudi airspace for strikes against Iran, restored crude oil exports to about 90 percent of pre-war levels by early July as ties with Iran strengthened.
Rejecting Israel's role as a trade hub does not mean excluding it as a factor. Israel retains what none of the corridor builders possess: military potential to achieve and undermine any unwanted route—and it does not approve of any route that strengthens its rivals or excludes it from the process.
A century ago, regional integration projects were repeatedly destroyed by imperial powers and the states these powers established at the crossroads of three continents. Names have changed, and maps have become glossy, but the dynamic remains the same. During the war with Iran, Israel deployed Iron Dome batteries and its own groups to the UAE—for the first time, the system went beyond Israeli territory with attached troops. This means that the state attempting to build a corridor around Israel needed an Israeli battery for survival against Iranian missiles.
Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi may continue to draw corridors, but until now, none of them can provide an open route against Israel; they are merely drawing maps, not building strategy.
Meesho demonstrated a significant improvement in its financial performance in the first quarter of fiscal year 27. During the reporting period, the company's net loss nearly halved compared to the same quarter of the previous fiscal year, while revenue increased by 48.3%.
As of now, the marketplace's net loss stood at 132.8 crore rupees in the first quarter of fiscal year 27, which is significantly less than the figure of 289.3 crore rupees for the corresponding quarter of the previous fiscal year. Revenue for this quarter reached 3,713 crore rupees, reflecting a year-on-year growth of 48.3%. The company attributes this revenue growth to improved delivery conversion, aided by a reduction in order cancellations.
Meesho's Net Merchandise Value (NMV) grew by 34% year-on-year, reaching 11,614 crore rupees. This growth is driven by a continuous increase in the number of users and enhanced engagement on the platform. The Annual Transactional User Pool (ATUs) increased by 29% year-on-year to 274 million people, and the purchase frequency improved to 10.3 transactions per user annually.
During the quarter, the number of placed orders grew by 29% year-on-year, reaching 725 million, indicating the ongoing expansion of the marketplace. Meesho's CFO, Dinesh Bansal, noted that this quarter marked the highest margin and adjusted EBITDA for the marketplace since its listing, despite increases in fuel costs and minimum wages in some states, which is a result of structural improvements on the platform.
The company stated that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is becoming a fundamental element across all levels of its business—from product search and seller growth to logistics and engineering. In the first quarter, Meesho processed nearly 725 million orders, averaging over 90 orders per second. Dinesh Bansal added that as AI continues to lower the cost of innovation, it will help create better products faster while maintaining disciplined capital allocation and building long-term value.
Regarding future forecasts, Meesho remains vigilant about the macroeconomic environment. The company noted that the decline in crude oil prices in the current quarter led to stable retail fuel prices, and the direct impact of this factor on the business remains limited, not causing a significant rise in platform prices.
Anglo American demonstrated high operational results in copper and iron ore mining in the second quarter, which was reflected in a 5.2% rise in its shares on Thursday following the publication of the second-quarter report.
CEO Duncan Van Blader noted that in the copper segment, the company's Collahuasi and Quellaveco operations increased production volumes, while the restart of the second plant in Los Bronces continues to provide additional profitable output. Regarding premium iron ore, Kumba and Minas-Rio maintained stable operational characteristics.
The company faced some inflationary trends caused by rising fuel prices and other mining consumables, linked to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and global market volatility. Despite this, the company's supply chain is managing raw material costs, and strong revenue from copper byproducts allowed it to lower the forecast for unit costs for Copper Chile to 210 cents per pound sterling (down from approximately 230 cents per pound sterling previously) and for Copper Peru to 65 cents per pound sterling (down from previously around 100 cents per pound sterling).
The group's portfolio optimization process is gaining momentum. In May, an agreement was reached to sell the coking coal business in Australia to Dhilmar for up to US$3.88 billion in cash. The sale of De Beers was also progressing, and optimization opportunities were used to minimize the impact of the complex diamond market.
Work continued on obtaining antitrust approval from the European Commission for the nickel business sale. Furthermore, the merger deal between Anglo American and Teck, aimed at creating a global leader in metals and minerals with a focus on copper, remains on schedule, with an expected completion date between September 2026 and March 2027.
Van Blader emphasized that the company is nearing the completion of the deal, with the final regulatory hurdle being antitrust approval from China. Integration planning is advanced and focused on ensuring the company is ready to realize the identified tangible value and synergies from Anglo Teck after the deal closes.
Copper production volume remained unchanged at 173,200 tonnes for the reporting period. This was mainly due to increased throughput at Los Bronces, which was offset by processing low-grade ore from the Collahuasi stockpile and expected lower grades at Quellaveco.
Premium iron ore production decreased by 3%, totaling 15.4 million tonnes. This was attributed to planned maintenance at Kumba, as well as the influence of lower ore grades and reduced mass recovery at Minas-Rio.
Manganese ore production increased by 22%, reaching 908,300 tonnes. This growth reflects higher operating levels following the impact of a tropical cyclone in Australia, which affected the comparative period.
Rough diamond production increased by 88%, reaching 7.8 million carats. The main driver was the extended maintenance period at Orapa, which impacted the previous quarter, as well as planned extraction of higher-quality ore at Jwaneng and Gahcho Kue.
Overall, the forecast for unit copper costs was revised downwards to 145 cents per pound sterling (compared to the previous 172 cents per pound sterling). Premium iron ore production of 15.4 million tonnes was 3% below the same period, due to reduced production at both Kumba and Minas-Rio.
Production at Kumba decreased by 4%, amounting to 8.8 million tonnes. This was due to a 16% reduction in production at Kolomela to 2.4 million tonnes following a planned plant shutdown coinciding with scheduled railway track repairs. However, this was partially offset by a 1% increase in production at Sishen to 6.5 million tonnes due to improved feedstock supply and increased plant availability, despite challenging conditions with some of the heaviest rainfall in many decades in the second quarter.
Total sales volume decreased by 4% to 9.4 million tonnes due to a 10-day third-party logistics shutdown in May. The iron ore production forecast for 2026 remained unchanged.
Rough diamond production rose by 88% to 7.8 million carats, linked to the extended maintenance period at Orapa in Botswana during the comparative period, as well as planned extraction of higher-quality ore at Jwaneng in Botswana and Gahcho Kue in Canada. Planned plant maintenance at Orapa and Jwaneng in the second half of the year is expected to significantly reduce production levels compared to current rates.
In South Africa, production at Venetia increased to 0.7 million carats, largely due to the processing of large volumes of underground ore. Venetia production will be suspended in the second half of the year.
