The author shares experience, noting that many deals are concluded based on promises rather than a real product. Often, presentations look convincing, and roadmaps are sold as if development is already complete. However, after signing the contract, it turns out that the bill is larger than the deal itself.
The difference between a demo and a product
It is important to distinguish between a demonstration and a finished product. A demo must successfully pass 20 minutes in a controlled environment, whereas a real product must function for years under client conditions: with their data, exceptional use cases, staff changes, and audits. Closing this gap is the main job.
When sales are conducted as if this gap has already been bridged, the work does not disappear; it merely shifts costs. These expenses move from the company's development budget to the client's operating expenses, causing real damage.
Signs of problematic deals
Such deals are easily recognized by the implementation process: deadlines are missed, the scope of work is subtly reduced, and the client's employees have to fix problems that were not initially anticipated. What was sold as a finished platform turns out to be half-finished, and the best engineers spend time firefighting old projects instead of working on new ones.
Systemic reasons for this behavior
It is incorrect to blame only the salespeople, as pressure is built into the system itself. The sales department receives compensation for orders in the current quarter, not for renewals three years later. Founders seeking investment need a logo more than they need margin. Companies whose stocks are traded are pressured by shareholders to generate income now rather than quality that can be monetized later.
The combination of insufficient domain knowledge and limited production capacity prevalent in the market makes selling 'half-baked' almost rational.
Financial and reputational costs
The consequences are often ignored because they manifest late and fall onto someone else's desk. First and foremost, trust suffers. In the corporate technology sector, especially in South Africa, trust is a key element, and negative experiences spread quickly among potential clients. Other bills follow: legal risks for claiming 'delivery' of what was not done, disappointment of the client whose plans were disrupted due to faith in the company, and constant overload of the engineering team.
In the public sector, examples are the most expensive: large launches, constantly growing budgets, and deadlines exceeding ministerial terms. In the private sector, this manifests more quietly—in customer attrition rather than loud headlines.
Alternative approach and honesty
There is another side to the coin. It is necessary to launch the product early, learn from real users, and continuously improve it. The principle of 'pretend until you succeed' helped create real companies. Sometimes, development acceleration is used to finance the process itself. However, one cannot wait for the perfect moment, or a competitor will seize the niche while you polish the details.
The author agrees with the idea of an early start but emphasizes a clear boundary: ambition is the realization of a roadmap that the company is ready to execute and for which resources are allocated. Selling possibilities that lack a real path to execution is a lie with an attached bill. The first brings trust upon delivery and ensures long-term customers; the second wastes trust that cannot be restored.
How to build an honest sales process
The solution is not to abandon ambitious sales, but to be extremely honest about what has already been created, what is on the roadmap, and what remains merely a wish. It is necessary to price correctly and allocate resources to cover the gap between these three categories. This implies that the sales team must have the right to say 'not yet,' and the commercial model must encourage contract renewal, not just the signing of the first deal.
The author gives an example where creating network management systems required all employees, including the sales department, to understand the client's network protocols as well as, or better than, the client itself. The right to sell a solution arises only after a deep understanding of the client's world, allowing one to see problems the client has not yet noticed.
When the client insists on quick wins—value here and now, this quarter—the honest answer almost always sounds like: 'Not today, but together we can create this within the next few years.' Although this may seem like a weaker offer, clients are actually capable of recognizing the 'no problems, we will do it' pattern and prefer to work with those they trust, not those who agree to everything.
This approach is slower and yields fewer deals in the current quarter, but it brings much more over the decade because the concluded deals remain valid.
The cost of haste and technical debt
Having experience as both a provider and a client, the author concludes that the market ultimately judges the truth. One can borrow from the future—one's engineering capacity, the client's patience, one's own reputation. But this is a loan, not a gift, and interest accrues on it. These shortcuts taken for a quick sale and the release of an unfinished product do not disappear after the deal closes; they accumulate in the system as technical debt, and that is when interest begins to accrue.
