The viability of establishing a permanent base on the Moon requires more than just highly qualified astronauts, according to a study conducted by researchers from George Mason University. The research concluded that the success of future expeditions will be primarily determined by team structure, replenishment regularity, and the ability to respond to unforeseen events.
Using computational simulations, scientists tested various scenarios, considering the number of crew members, the duration of stay on the lunar surface, and the environmental conditions projected for a facility near the Moon's south pole, aligned with the goals of NASA's Artemis program.
The findings indicate that missions composed of six members, with frequently delivered supplies, have a higher probability of achieving goals. In contrast, smaller teams, combined with longer intervals between supply shipments and high environmental risks, face greater obstacles in maintaining productivity.
The work of George Mason University aimed to identify the ideal conditions for the operation of a durable lunar base and map elements that could compromise operations. To this end, scientists applied agent-based modeling, a computational method used to replicate the behavior of complex systems, seeking to understand how varied interactions generate collective behaviors in multi-factorial scenarios.
During the tests, different numbers of astronauts were simulated, and the deadlines between resupply missions were modified. In an initial scenario, a team would stay on the surface for three months, receiving new supplies and having part of the crew replaced only in the second month. In this configuration, the simulated productivity reached about 20% of planned tasks, an index considered acceptable for certain processes, although the authors note that this estimate ignores unforeseen events that could impact performance.
Anamaria Berea, a computational social scientist at George Mason University and co-author of the study, clarified that the focus of the research was understanding human factors in long-duration space missions. She warned that the worst-case scenario would consist of four astronauts on the Moon simultaneously, with only one monthly window for resupply from Earth and moderate to high chances of unfavorable environmental conditions, according to an interview given to Space.com.
The researcher highlighted that the most promising scenario involves six astronauts working together on the lunar surface, with supplies sent every fifteen days and a lower incidence of extremes, such as intense radiation or micrometeorite impacts. The study also classifies lunar bases as confined and isolated environments, where groups must operate for long periods with limited resources, restricted communication, and high dependence on remote support. Analogous situations have already been observed in research in Antarctica, submarines, and oil platforms.
Berea emphasized that the collective behavior of teams has a great influence on mission outcomes, pointing to a sensitive balance between small and large groups, since interactions between members can generate positive or negative effects on performance. She stressed that even with high training, in long missions or deep space, there will always be a human component involved. Furthermore, she suggested that improving aspects such as mission duration, resupply frequency, and contingency plans will yield more significant results than simply increasing astronaut training.
Despite these conclusions, the text mentions that NASA adopts a distinct approach in preparing its crews. Astronauts destined for the International Space Station spend years in training focused on remote environments, including psychological preparation for isolation, prolonged coexistence, and conflict resolution.
The Canadian Space Agency, when describing this process based on NASA protocols, reports that astronauts receive repetitive training to recognize their own reactions and understand colleagues' behavior, while also benefiting from constant support from ground teams during missions. Another relevant point is the accumulated experience on the International Space Station, whose data from the NASA Inspector General's Office shows an increase in the scientific use of the station, even with interruptions caused by technical failures and other unforeseen events.
The report also indicates that larger crews tend to distribute maintenance tasks better, freeing up more time for research activities. However, the document warns that the limitation of vehicles for transporting crew and cargo to the station constitutes an operational risk, as it decreases the essential redundancy needed to ensure continuous mission supply. For the study's authors, it is crucial to anticipate the multiple interactions between people, equipment, and environmental conditions before humans reside and work for long periods in a future permanent lunar base.
Jim Bridenstine, former NASA administrator, expressed doubts about the chosen structure for the Artemis missions, the program intended to bring astronauts back to the Moon. This statement was made during his participation in a Space.com podcast on June 12th while discussing current challenges in space exploration.
Bridenstine, who led NASA during President Donald Trump's first term, warned that the lunar modules contracted by the agency remain one of the biggest hurdles to the established schedule. The current plan anticipates a crewed landing in 2028 during the Artemis 4 mission.
The former administrator's concern is linked to the development level of the vehicles selected by NASA: SpaceX's Starship and Blue Origin's Blue Moon. Both require finalizing tests before being deemed suitable to carry crews to the lunar surface.
In the conversation on the podcast This Week in Space, hosted by Tariq Malik and Rod Pyle, Bridenstine contrasted the Artemis strategy with the model used in the Apollo missions, which took place in the 1960s and 1970s. According to his analysis, the current program requires a considerably longer sequence of procedures.
The former NASA chief emphasized that the Apollo project had a simpler architecture, integrating the lander with the assembly launched by the Saturn V rocket. In contrast, Artemis requires multiple launches and an in-space rendezvous operation. He stated that the architecture is 'extraordinarily complicated.'
For Bridenstine, the simplicity adopted in the Apollo program was a crucial factor in the United States reaching the Moon shortly after the announcement made by then-President John F. Kennedy. Reducing complexity, he argued, was decisive in achieving that goal.
The landers contracted by NASA also face additional phases before any crewed mission. Both Starship and Blue Moon must conduct uncrewed demonstration flights and pass rigorous certification processes before being cleared for human operations.
The Artemis design envisions the lunar vehicles being launched separately from the rocket carrying the Orion capsule. Additionally, the landers will need to perform in-space refueling before taking astronauts to the Moon and returning to lunar orbit to connect with the crewed spacecraft.
A report mentioned in NASA material indicated that Starship may require a minimum of 15 extra launches to complete the necessary supply for a full lunar mission. The exact number of refueling flights for each lander has not yet been determined.
Artemis 3, planned as preparation for the 2028 landing, should test the integration between Orion and the two lunar vehicles in low Earth orbit. During this trip, astronauts will have to rendezvous and dock with the landers for approximately two weeks.
The performance of the vehicles in this phase could influence future NASA decisions. The agency had already expressed concern over Starship's development due to delays while evaluating possible changes to the Artemis 3 lander contract.
Bridenstine stressed that the highest priority must be finding a solution that allows a lander to become operational as quickly as possible. He concluded by saying that 'whatever is necessary to build a lander as fast as possible is what we should be doing as a country.'
